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INTRODUCTION
Public policy, that necessary consequence of the 
Leviathan, is the end product of a power holder's reaction 
to fear. Man likes to view himself as a rational being 
endowed with the ability to govern his own life as he chooses. 
Yet, roan's actions are not to be found originating within 
his mental consciousness in an example of spontaneous com­
bustion. Man's action© are more properly defined as reac­
tions. There roust be an outside stimulus to motivate the 
human creature into taking positive or negative steps. The 
outside stimulus must be, either consciously or subconsciously, 
recognized by man as affecting him personally; and the 
knowledge of its doing so gives him an unpleasant sense of 
insecurity--of fear. Through inborn and ©xperientially 
dictated response© which are Individualistic in nature, man 
react© to remove the fear and return to a state of mental 
tranquility. Man's acts are truly rational only in so far 
as they are a natural consequence of hi© need for security. 
Popular conception© to the contrary, man doe© not feel secure 
if he is placed in a position where he is called upon to 
govern his own life. His very nature cause© him to seek 
out and to allow other© to stand over him. There have been 
those who have met man's need to be governed and have gathered
2to "themselves the power "to direct the composite msn— the 
polity. It is to these holders of power that the ability 
to make public policy has Fallen. Yet* these men cannot 
remove from themselves their own humanness. They, too, 
must have an outside stimulus to cause them to act. They, 
too* are motivated by fear and it© reflection is found in 
the actions they undertake. fubllc policy, then, is a 
minority’s reaction to fear.
To support the part of the hypothesis concerning 
power to form public policy being held in but a few hands, 
a review of elitist theory concerning the presence of a 
few such power holders in every organization and elitist 
interpretations of why this phenomena takes place will be 
given. Their argument centers around the fact that only a 
few of the broad membership have the inclination and ability 
to grasp an organization*© leadership. Further, if suc» 
oessful, the oligarchy will resist broadening the power 
base and try to prevent other® from gaining similar status.
Within the oligarchy will occasionally be found one 
individual who holds more power then anyone else. He will 
be recognized as the head of the organization and it is 
From him that most of the group’s policies emanate. Should 
another of the oligarch© have a desire to form a policy of 
his own, he may be able to succeed. Unless the leader’s 
position is rather tenuous, however, it is rare for such 
an act to occur without either the aoquieeence, ignorance,
3indifference, or support: of the organization*s head.
To add weight to the elitist conclusions, note wiil 
foe made of the tendency of man to forego the chance to 
govern himself and to turn instead toward a leader. Other 
theories substantiating and explaining elitist observations 
as a biological consequence of man*© evolution and struggle 
to survive also will foe put forth.
After looking at who makes policy, the examination 
will turn to why it is made. The basic conclusion is that 
man was shaped by his desire to live. The ability to fear 
was implanted within him to aid in this endeavor. fcfhen 
men is threatened, he feels afraid and reacts to remove 
the fear. What may foe threatened is his actual physical 
life, or the self he wishes to foe. In either case, should 
the power holder have reason to be afraid, he will react 
with policies to alleviate his anxiety.
The remainder of the study will explore some of the 
fears which motivate men’s responses. Examples of a partic­
ular fear embodied in the cause of an action then wiil foe 
presented. While what is dealt with can be applied to ©my 
organization, the organizations which will foe examined through­
out the investigation are nation-states. The leader® to foe 
shown initiating actions will usually foe various chief ex­
ecutives of those states. Occasionally other of the oli­
garchs will foe mentioned, but it is the chief executive who 
popularly is recognized a© embodying the decision-making
4process and, with the exception of those state© where there 
is a differentiation between the heads of state and govern- 
ment, the nation itself. For "when he is insulted, the 
nation is insulted* when he ha© a dream, the nation has a
dreamj when he has ©n antagonist, the nation ha© an antag­
onist."^* Therein lies the importance for such a study in 
that it will aid in understanding the reason© behind the 
actions encompassing the entire citizenry and have an all 
too real effect upon their lives*
Some clarification of what will be called public
policy must first be made to help understand what is to
follow. Public policy must not toe confused with governmental 
action. While they usually ere synonymous, it 1© not a 
universal constant. Public policy is the result of a power 
holder*© desires {reactions}. He must, however, because of 
the magnitude of his office, delegate the responsibility of 
transferring his policies into action to others. These 
"others" have fear© of their own, however, upon which they 
must act. For them, fear of the result of not doing as 
ordered may be less than the fear of doing something that is 
personally repugnant to their beliefs or ©ansitivities. They 
will thus fail to implement the policies*^
*®eorg© E* Reedy, The Twilight of the Presidency 
{New Yorks The New American OBraryT I n c 1 ^ 7 l T ,  p. 1J 28.
& •Reedy in Ibid., pp. 43-43'and Richard £. Neustadt in 
Pres1dentlal Power (New Yorks The New American Library, Inc., 
~r 19643" make"'' the point of m leader*© power being determined by 
the ability of the leader to persuade those around him to do 
his bidding.
5Robert; C. Tuc'ker has pointed out that a dictator has 
a great deal of control over his state’s bureaucracy and he 
is able to transfer his desires into action•5 This is not 
as true in a democracy. bong before the Cuban missile 
crisis arose, President John P. Kennedy ordered the removal 
of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey. This directive 
was not carried out, and it was only with the development of 
the Cuban situation that Kennedy discovered the State 
Department’s failure to respond.*^ Clearly public policy and 
governmental action [or inaction as the case may be] were 
not one and the same in this instance.
Another important facet in this regard is it may be 
the power holder who desires not to act. In a somewhat 
different context, Peter Saehrach and Morton S. Baratz have 
accurately stated that recognition of non-decisions is as 
important as concentrating on actual decisions.5 Public 
policy calling for inaction is important to consider for it 
is just as much of a reaction to fear as is the policy designed 
to activate positive moves. It may also be that the power 
holder’s reaction is so severe that he not only develops 
policy calling for an absence of action, but that he may,
^Robert C. Tucker, "The Dictator and Totalitarianism,” 
World Politics, XVII [July, 1965), 555-583.
^Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days [New York? The New 
American Library, Inc., 1969], pp. 94-95.
5Peter Bachraoh and Morton S* Baratz, "Two Faces of 
Power," American Political Science Review, LVI [December,
1962], 947-952.
5like an ostrich, ©tick his head in the sand and no longer
perceive the existence of a certain situation.
Considering the word fear, James C, Davie© write©
tens^on which ”is characteristically derived from a
specific need and released in some kind of activity rele*
vant to a particular need, even though the activity may
hat be functional to the *real# relief of the tension,”®
As regards."unpleasant mental tension,” Davie© categorizes
two types—••fear and anxiety,'
Fear is intense, short in duration, specific, and 
is usually related to physical survival. , * • Anxiety 
is chronic, relatively low level Ct;hat is, not in­
tense), and vague* • • • Fear is apt to produce 
a prompt reaction either to remove the object 
of fear from oneself or oneself from the object of 
fear. , , . Anxiety on the other hand is chronic 
and vague. It endures over a long period of time 
and is Cdifficult) to locate. . . .  It produces 
a different kind of reaction. One does not know 
quite what is the cause for his anxiety and, part­
ly for that reason, he does not know quite what
to do •
For the purposes of this study, the terms fear and anxiety 
will be used interchangeably. If specification i© deemed 
necessary to ©how the degree of fear felt, an adjective 
will be used. This is not to deny the importance of
remembering that fear doe© come in various magnitudes. A
power holder1© fears do change from moment to moment and
FiJames C. Davies, Human Nature in Folitics {New York? 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc.*'1963), p. 64.
7Ibid., pp. 66-67.
7the Fluctuating strengths or weaknesses of a particular 
Fear, or between separate Fears, do have much to do with 
the type of reactIon that the man has and thus the type 
of policies he develops.
Where possible, the words of a power holder will 
be given to support the hypothesis* While one cannot 
completely reject the words a power holder spoke before 
achieving power in explaining actions after reaching the 
pinnacle, more importance should be placed upon those 
utterances emanating from the latter position. Often when
a
one’s social status changes, so, too, does his personality.”
The proud man often becomes humble, servility 
changes to arrogance, an honest nature learn© to 
lie, or at least to dissemble, under pressure of 
need, while the man who has an ingrained habit 
of lying and bluffing makes himself over and puts 
on an outward semblance at least of honesty and 
firmness in character.
And often, as will be mentioned later, the man whose status
change© from power seeker to power holder will com© to
possess different motivating fears and thereby different
reasons for acting.
Obviously the power holder 1© not going to bare his
innermost.drives and publicly vent his fears. In many cases,
he will not even realize them himaelf. Thosa people that
are closest to the power holder will likewise often be in
the dark as to the true motivation of their common nuoleus,
®Gaetano Mosca, The fluling Class [New York5 McGraw- 
Hill Book Company, Inc., 1939}, p. 53.
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Therefor©, the word© of the power holder end the perc§p*
tions of his associates are actually often of little aid
in giving satisfactory insights into the true reasons behind
the formulation of a policy. Because of thi®, policies will
often necessarily have to be focused upon rather than
words for a clearer understanding of the power holder*
Admittedly much of the following will be speculative.
There is no more complex subject in life than man. And as
there is no surety in life* there is, therefore* none in man.
The greatest difficulty in judging him and his thoughts
and actions is that one is in truth judging oneself. It
would require a creature from another planet to be able
to make impartial conclusions regarding man. Yet, man has
never ©topped seeking to explain his own world* In examining
that part of man's environment known a© politics and power,
the complexities encountered and the necessity in doing
so were put dawn.by. Machi©veili writing to his Prince:^
Men in general judge more by the eyes thrai by the 
hands, for every one can see, but very few have to 
feel. Everybody sees what you appear to be, few 
feel what you are, and those few will not dare to 
oppose themselves to the many, who have the majority 
of the state to defend them) and in the action© 
of men, and especially of princes, from which there 
is no appeal, the end justifies the means.
^Niccolo Machiaveili, The Prince, trans. by Luigi 
Ricci [New York: The American Library, Inc., 19523, P*
94 •
CHAPTER I 
THE AUTHOR OF PUBLIC POLICY
The power to make public policy ie Held by a 
minority of a nation*© citizenry* Occasionally a large 
bulk of decision making is centered in but one individual.
The elitist theorists, especially Gaetano Mosca, Viifredo 
Pareto and Robert Michels, have recognized power*© proeliv- 
ity to fall Into the hands of a minority and have focused 
attention upon the tendency. The elitist probing of the 
phenomena give© some insight© into the oligarchical features 
of policy formulation as a necessary consequence of organi­
zation* Erich Fromm*© observations provide some further 
explanation of minority rule. He holds ©elf rule and man 
to be incompatible. Finally, the field of biology gives fur­
ther prodf that submission to leaders is a natural product 
of man's evolution*
Gaetano Mosea epitomized the basic tenet© of what ha© 
come to be known a© elitist theory when he stated:*
Among the constant fact© and tendencies that are to 
be found in political organisms, one is so obvious that 
it is apparent to the most casual eye* In ell 
societies * * * two classes of people appear— a class 
that rule© and a class that ie ruled. The first class# 
alwpys the less numerous, perform© all
^Mosca, The Ruling Glass, p. SO.
9political Functions* Cand3 monopolizes power . . . 
whereas the second, the more numerous class, is 
directed and controlled by the first.
No matter what name is given to the type of governmental 
system a state or organization possesses, a minority*-an 
©lite— will be Found holding the rein© of power For that 
state or organization.
ViIfredo Pareto made note of another phenomena which 
added to the school of elitist thought. He, too, recognized 
the obvious presence of a ruling class.8 The additional 
existence of others who wish and endeavor to become part 
of the oligarchy cannot be denied* A© Pareto notes, the 
First group wishes to remain in power, but For various reasons 
the elite will come to lose its vitality and those strug­
gling on the outside For political status will occasionally 
be allowed to join with or will overthrow and supplant the 
power holders. Pareto has thus shown that the ruling class 
does not remain static. There is instead a ’’circulation of 
elites” and occasional change© in who constitutes the govern­
ing oligarchy*8
Mhat is the importance of the desire to gain power
^Pareto-* s words sound quite similar to those of Mo see 
He wrote s ’’The least we can do is to divide society into 
two stratai a higher stratum, which usually contains the 
rulers, and a lower stratum, which usually contains the 
ruled. The Fact is so obvious that it has always Forced 
itself upon the most casual observation • . • ViIfredo
Pareto, The Mind and Society, trans* by Andrew Songiorne r; 
and Arthur Livingston [New York t Harcourt, Brace and 
Company, 19353, p. 1437.
3Xbid.. pp. 1430—1533.
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by one group and the desire to maintain sole control of it by 
another'?
The elitist answer:4
The whole history of civilized mankind comes down 
to a conflict between the tendency of dominant elements 
to monopolize political power and transmit possession 
of it by inheritance, and the tendency toward a 
dislocation of old forces and an insurgence of new 
forces *
While the group known as power seekers doe© unques­
tionably lie behind the cause for numerous public policies, 
for present purposes it is necessary to remember only one 
minority can be the actual holders of power at one time.
Now the question? Why does power fall to but a'few 
individuals?
The elitist conclusion comes from Robert Michels.0 
His affiliation© with, and studies of, the German Socialist 
party directed Him to formulate theories which help to ex­
plain those previously mentioned. Michels agrees a minor­
ity always rules. He termed the tendency for minority rule 
the ”iron law of oligarchy.” Oligarchy occur© because the 
group which becomes spokesman for an organization develops 
a penchant for power. This collection of individuals realizes 
the urge and out of self interest becomes consolidated and 
organized to withstand any challenge© to it© preferred
^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 65.
^Robert Michels, Political t Parties, trens* by Eden 
Paul and Cedar Paul CNew York? The Free Press, 1962]•
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status. The majority, on the other hand, i© naturally 
passive and thereby allows the minority to take control.
NicheIs states the chief reason underlying the birth and 
sustenance of the oligarchy, however, is the very nature of 
the organisation itself. Any group wishing to have an 
impact upon its surroundings must organise to realize its 
greatest possible strength. To organize take© technical 
capabilities* to keep the group functioning in unison like­
wise takes ©kills. These character1stice, along with the 
desire to use them, are found in only a few, giving that 
few the authority to rule. The more expansive the group 
is, the greater the need for organization. In order to 
make it more responsive and unified, it must become 
increasingly centralized. A© the size of the group en­
larges, the number of people with capabilities of directing 
it, in return, diminishes. Power is thus necessarily 
grasped by Fewer and fewer hands and organization becomes 
synonymous' with oligarchy. And -lis Nichel© implied, organ­
ization become© synonymous with nation-state.
Power comes to be held by an ever decreasing number. 
IF,mot checked, the tendency reaches the conclusion, no 
matter how the ©tat© is originally constructed, of a singular 
person arising from within the oligarchy to grasp increasing 
power and overshadow each of the other members of the policy- 
making elite* The dominant power of this person is under­
stood by at least the ruling class if not the entire
12
populace. When speaking, then, of the oligarchical features 
of an organization, it must be remembered a situation can 
develop where *there is one individual who is chief among 
the leaders of the ruling class as a whole and stands • * •
at the helm of the ©tate."^ tItalics added).
It may foe that this singular person is not the 
visible, "legal* ruler of the state. A dominant power holder 
may instead foe found behind the scenes giving, not solely 
advice, but actual orders to what the overwhelming majority
believes to foe the true "head" of the state. Vet, such e
situation is the exception to the rule. Overlooking 
hereditary accession to the throne, those who come to 
achieve supreme status as a dominant leader of a nation or 
member of the governing oligarchy do so out of desire for 
that position. Rare would foe the case where they would 
knowingly relinquish their long sought for power or their 
social status. While on© man admittedly never does hold 
complete power in a nation, one man occasionally doe© 
gravitate to himself dominant power in the realm of making 
public policy.
Evidence of other© who do advise and/or request 
favorable policies from a dominant power holder is not 
to foe denied. Often they ere able to shape end sway the 
thoughts and the resulting policy decisions of the man at
^MoecSf The Ruling Class, pp. SO-51.
13
•the top of the power structure* Yet, in the final analysis, 
it ie for the one dominant individual end him alone to accept 
or reject the advice, to act or not to act, to commit himself 
to a certain policy or not to do so. President Harry 
Trumanfs desk had a sign summing up the situation* It said, 
"The Suck Stops Here.” Where the buck stops, one will 
find the man of power*
The "iron law of oligarchy" largely tends to conclude 
in power for policy making falling under the domain of a 
singular individual, e*g*, a Stalin, a Qe Gaulle, a Hitler, a 
Lincoln, who govern© according to what the time, the place, 
and his own personal characteristic© dictate. A© the elitist 
proponents would agree, "government is an act of grace, but 
the ultimate sovereign is not God or the spirit of the 
revolution or what not. It is the person of the ruler."'7
Samuel H. Geer, Nicholas Wahl and Peter H. Merkl 
have examined the legislative branches of Britain, France and 
Germany respectively. Each found evidence of the same trend 
of power concentration in the government they viewed.
In each case there was a recognizable shift of power from
70avies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 300. Regarding 
the thought "the ultimate sovereign is . . . the person of 
the ruler" Charles Merriam makes an interesting point in 
Political Power CNew Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 
1934j, pp• 51-52• In political thought sovereignty is 
theoretically not divisible. However, in the realm of 
international relations, each state, large or small, is 
regarded as an equal. Each is supposedly sovereign. The 
accomodation to theory satisfies the power holder's desire 
to have no one above him.
14
the legislature to the executive* To become lodged in an 
ever decreasing minority--in on© man--is th© natural ten­
dency of” power#
However, the qualification of th© tendency reaching 
its conclusion only if allowed to continue unchecked was 
made* It must be stressed, the end result of on© ruling 
class* existence is one person reaching the top of the 
oligarchy# Before the conclusion is reached, an era of 
competing oligarchs striving for supremacy is present. 
Dominant power hangs temptingly like the forbidden fruit 
waiting only to be plucked* It doe© not hang in the sight 
of but one individual, however, but in the sight of many 
who are all easily tempted* In the wild scramble to reach 
the bough where th© fruit hangs, the competitors may end up 
trampling each other so that no one comes to wear the 
mantle of supremacy.
There are often eras found consisting of dominant 
rule of the few rather than the one# In many democracies, 
executive dominance of late did not occur until after 
period© of legislative supremacy.* Yet, within th© organ­
ization of the legislative branch itself, sub-oligarchies
p
Samuel H* Seer, f,The British Legislature and the 
Problem of Mobilizing Consent,** Nicholas Wahl, "The French 
Parliament: From Last Word to Afterthought,” Peter H*
Merkl, **Party Government in the Bonn Republic,1* ©11 , three 
In Law Makers in © Changing World, ed* by Elke Frank 
CEnglewood CiifF©7 New Jersey: Frentice-Hali, Inc., 19661•
15
of the ruling class were and are present;. In -the Unitied 
States, John C , Calhoun, Daniel Webster and Henry Clay 
are recognized as being dominant policy makers of their 
time and countryi Still the policies Initiated during 
their era did come From more than one source. Perhaps 
they were guilty of trampling each other.
Such infighting is surely what happened within 
France’s Fourth Republic where a number of government© 
quickly rose and fell; When one sat as head of the govern* 
ment, many policies emanating from his office were the 
policies of members of his supporting coalition. Should 
he flout - the desires of hi© allies, their support was 
gone and his government fell. Often in the history of 
the nation-state, the competition for dominance within 
the elite itself exerts a strong check upon the "iron 
law of oligarchy" running it© course.
Power is of a dynamic quality deploring a vacuum.
If power is not exercised, it often is not held. There 
ha© been m propensity in the United States, too, for 
policy making to drift to the executive. However, fol­
lowing th© Russian launching of Sputnik in 1957, President 
Dwight 0. Eisenhower took no positive responsive measures* 
The majority leader in the Senate, Lyndon 8. Johnson, 
stepped into the vacuums he held inquiries into the matter 
and pushed through Congress a bill to improve America's 
Hole in space exploration* providing the obvious example
16
of policy being formed by someone other than the chief 
executive of the nation.® The power to make policy is 
never completely held by one man. Yet, as in this example, 
when policies are made, they are th© result of one man’s 
effort with the support of, and often modifioations by, 
other oligarchs.
Even should there be a person holding what is 
recognized as dominant power, many policies ©till will 
be made by others. Some policies will be initiated from 
within hie own coterie. Definitely Lavrenty Beria, Robert 
McNamara, Heinrich Himmier, and Edwin Stanton initiated 
policies on their own affecting their nations to dome 
degree. Since the head of any organization, certainly in­
cluding one as vast as a nation-state, must allow some 
decisions to be made independently of himself, absolute power 
is never held by on© individual. Others, both in and out­
side of a dominant power holder’s group, exercise it with 
the same qualification© upon their acts as is found upon 
any dominant possessor of power.
Power inherently ha© limitation© on its exercise.
Even a dominant power holder must rely on other© to retain 
his position and to carry out his policies. A© the natural 
tendency of the organization necessitates the situation, 
power is always ©hared, and its exercise is always checked 
%
^Reedy, Twilight, pp. 56-62.
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by the need not to antagonize those whose support must 
be maintained*
A Further control against the rise of the dominant 
power holder, is Found outside the oligarchy* There are 
those on the periphery oF the structure who are likewise 
tempted to reach For power and sometimes succeed* The 
result is the circulation oF elites,” and the ”iron lew 
oF oligarchy” must start anew on the road oF concentrating 
power into Fewer and Fewer hands, often without ever 
having neared the ultimate destination oF dominant rule by 
one man.
V
Elitist observations are often regarded with anathema 
by those who regard democracy as the ideal Form oF govern­
ment* The elitist theorists will ©ay what ought to be and 
what is are two diFFerent subject©* They have written that 
there is a class oF power holders in every country, including 
the United States.^ In response, there have been pluralist
attack© launched against such conclusions^* in an eFFort to
13refute, elitism* Similar maneuvers have been made 
against the earlier philosopher© who Found evidence oF a
^Sees 0. Wright Mills* The Power Elite [New York; 
OxFord University Press, 19563•
^ S e e : Daniel Bell, ”The Power Elite--Beconsidered,”
The American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (November, 1958]* 
238-350.
lSpor* some diFFering comments on elitism, sea: Peter
Sachrach, ed*, Political Elites in a Democracy (New Yorks 
Atherton Press, 1971].
xe
ruling class.*3
Many of the democratic theorists have attempted to
deal with what is* rather than with what ought to toe# They
hold rule by the many really must and does exist# They do 
not realize that elitism per se Is not bad* It is simply 
fact# Those in power may toe good or they may be toad# Any 
evaluative conclusions depend upon whet the power holders 
and their observer© conceive to to© the proper rules of the 
political game# There are different rules for & country
with a heritage of dictatorships just as there are for ones
having democracy a© a basis of their political history. It 
is, in part, the conception of rule© and the underlying 
belief systems of nations which separate one from another. 
Because the elitists feel power invested in a minority to toe 
common to all polities, does not necessarily make elitism 
and democracy incompatible doctrine©.*^ In their separate 
foundations, it must to© admitted, the former Is based more 
on reality? the latter, on idealism.
One of d©mooraey,© basic tenets is the necessity of 
an educated, aware* motivated, and concerned citizenry. All
13For instance, some varying thoughts on Michel© can toe 
found ins Philip J# Cook, ’’Robert Michels* Political Parties 
in Perspective,n Journal of Politics, XXXIII C August, 197l3, 
773-798, C#W# Qassineili, ’’The Iron Law of Oligarchy,.** American 
Political Science Review, XLVII CSeptember, 19533, 773-784, 
and John 0# May* '’Democracy, Organization, Michels,” American 
Political Science Review, LlX CJune* 19853 * 417-439#
14Seei Joseph A. Schumpeter, Gap1telism, Socialism,
end Democracy (New Yorks Harper S Brothers Fublishers, 19503, 
pp* 369-389*
things, of course, are relative, but the majority of th© 
citizenry doe© not possess these qualities in the same 
magnitude the oligarchs do, Regarding motivation, in 
studies of a middle-size eastern city and two parishes in 
Louisiana, it was discovered that politician© who held an 
office viewed as having high powersand achievement potential 
were more strongly power and achievement motivated then non- 
politician© who otherwise held similar statue in the community
and occupations,*3 Motivation for power? It is found in
the oligarchs, not in the many.
Who ©re the politically concerned in a state? Herbert
Goldhamer say© it is not the great mass of people* Most 
individuals are concerned with matters other than public 
policy, with only a few finding satisfaction in dealing 
with it© formulation. The majority, even when they do 
become politically activated, e.g., at election time, will 
center their attention on personalities and not policies.*^
The conclusions should not be interpreted a© meaning 
no power is held by the greet mess of nonJpower holder©. A© 
Mosca was quick to point out, in a representative system 
those oligarch© who come to bear the title of represents- 
tlve and want to retain it, must rely upon th© votes of th©
ISRufu© P. Browning and Herbert Jacob, "Power Motiva­
tion and th© Political Personality,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 
XXVIII [Spring, 19643, 75-90.
i&Herbert 6oldhamer, "Public Opinion and Personality,” 
The American Journal of Sociology.LV [January, 19503, 346-354•
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many. Thay will thus necessarily listen to the people’s 
complaints. In this area, the majority does have power.^
For if those in power flatly reject the people’s entreaties 
and fall completely out of step with the great mas© of 
opinion in a state, the elite will be forced to change CIn­
herently or via "circulation"] or face a loss of power-— from 
no longer being obeyed to the more frightening possibility 
of being replaced* "Ultimately, the leader and hi© char­
acteristic© represent the group itself and are not at 
variance with its characteristics*"^8
In deference to the pluralist viewpoint, the people 
In any state under any form of government do have impact.
Their support or ©t least acquiescence is a must for those 
who would sit at the pinnacle of th© power hierarchy* It 
must be noted, say the pluralist©, if the leadership does 
not follow, or if it runs counter to, the will of the 
people, th© citizenry will rise and overthrow the tyran­
nical power holders. Therefore, th© people are for all 
Intents and purposes directing the nation. Yet, for that 
amorphous mass to rebel, it needs a Sorelian type of 
politically motivating myth19 and an organization. As in
l^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 155.
19Benjaroin N. Schoenfeld, "The Psychological Charac­
teristics of Leadership," Social Forces.XXVI [Nay, 1948], 396.
1 QSee: Georges Sorel, Reflections on Violence, trans.
by T *E. Hulme and J. Roth CGlencoe, Illinois: The Free Press,
1950].
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unity there is strength* so too, recalling Michels, ther© i© 
oligarchy. Fort tshere to be a revolts, tshen, "the mas© musts 
have an elite of it© own. There is the realm of the power 
seeker. He will spring From apparently nowhere to lead. He 
will give the people the necessary belief, the necessary 
motivation for rebellion. He will say, "Throw the seound*» 
rel out! H He will mean, "Put me into power! ** The power 
holder, in trying to prevent and destroy revolution attempts 
to provide the people the necessary belief, the necessary 
motivation, not to revolt. Therefore, the seekers and 
holders of authority together "are able to fashion, and 
within very wide limits, even to create the will of the 
people. . . .  So far as this is so, the will of the people 
is the product and not the motive of the political process."^ 
[Italics added].
The impact of the broad spectrum of the people on 
public policy is, in some sense, present. Considerations 
of the citizenry*© response to any planned move.' is often 
one of the aspects of proposed policy the leadership will 
try to fathom before acting. However, just as they did with 
their advisers, the leaders can ignore the majority. The 
power holder© may misjudge or fail to see the people*s 
possible response to an act. They may realize a public 
policy will have an unfavorable impaot upon the public.
^Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, p. 263*
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but; For other reason© -they will move anyway. The ability 
oF the power seeker© to use a policy to rally the people 
against the government 1© another oF the considerations 
sometime© taken into account by the power holders* &hile 
it may cause harm to their position later, the important 
Fact to remember 1© that policies can be, and are, made 
without regard of the people. In a circuitous route, the 
mss© may influence the oligarchy, but the reverse, as shown 
above, is more likely to be true. The perplexing question 
needing to be answered is whether or not the people act 
on their own. It would appear that democrats would say ,fy«9a,” 
the people can and do spontaneously react to a move by 
the government which i© against their wishes* From what 
has been presented already, however, the answer would appear 
to be ”n o T h e  mess is just that— a Formless, ununified, 
©pathetic group oF Individuals who are shaped and ©purred to 
attack or defend by the seekers and holder© of power*
Man may ©peek of the desirability of rule by the 
many. The philosophy give© meaning to one*© life. However, 
to a large extent, democracy is but motivating political 
myth and i© but a tool of the seeker or holder of authority* 
True, they possibly even believe it themselves* But be that 
a© it may, when one witnesses the action© of those before and 
and after achieving their goal of power a© they stir the 
masses by promising a Future utopian democracy, one sees 
the truth in the adage, Mth© revolutionaries of today become
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the reactionaries of tomorrow.” 2 1 The ”iron law of oil-\
garchy” continues with its metal-like invincibility and, if 
unchecked, power will gravitate to an ever decreasing 
number of individual®. The people*s continual subjection 
to the cycle and their willingness to sometime© help speed 
it to its final product rather than hindering it can be 
seen in history.
Why?
Erich Fromm, watching the rise to dominance of Adolf 
Hitler, formulated interesting hypotheses to shed some 
light on this mystery.3 3 Fromm felt man and democracy to be 
incompatible. Democracy, in freeing man, at the same time 
alienate© him from his environment. Man must look only to 
himself to find the answer© for the troubled world. As 
he can find no answer© within himself, he becomes lost, 
powerless and afraid. A threatening situation he must face 
will grow more pressing, and his feelings of helplessness 
will become magnified. Man will try to find relief by sub­
merging his fears, his freedom, hi© self in **© person, an 
institution, Hod, the nation, conscience, or a psychic com- 
pulsion."3 3  Just as a child will turn from a threat and go
g*Miohels, Political Parties, p. 187.
33Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom CNew Yorkt Discus 
Books, 1971}. ' '
g3 lbid., p. 177.
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to his father for comfort, so, too, man will turn from freedom 
and look to an authoritarian for respite. The figure of 
authority will calm hi® fears, answer his questions, and 
give him a plaoe in the sun where he will not have to rely 
on himself. The majority of mankind does not want demooraoy. 
They, as Goldhamer said, do not care to worry about policies. 
They focus on who will comfort them. It could be said they 
want a leader.
Masoa, Pareto and Michel© observed what mankind wants, 
mankind ha© received. Man*© political organizations are in­
deed controlled by elites. Within each elite there occasion­
ally is one man who comes to hold dominant power. Michels 
and Fromm each found reason© for the occurrence. The obser­
vations of these thinkers and other© have done much to 
damage the philosophies of those expounding the virtues of 
democracy. It has been left to another group, however, to 
deliver the potential coup de grace to the plurslists• Bio-l- 
bgiSt© have delivered theories and findings of their own 
substantiating and clarifying the causes of the phenomena of 
man and his acceptance of rulers.
With Charles Darwin and his The Origin of Species, ^  
new thoughts concerning man and hi© ancestors came to the 
fore. As Darwin points out, animals alive today have a long 
history of change behind them. The composite characteristics
^Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species CSth ed.; New 
York* 0. Appleton and Company, 1872T7
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for each animal, including man, and the million© of year© of 
©volution which have gone into making them,possess a certain 
logic* Life is harsh ©aid Qarwin and hi© followers* It 
was even more so, especially for man, back at the dawn of 
time. In that threatening and dangerous environment, only 
the Fittest survived. If an animal could defeat its enemies, 
it lived. If it could not, it died* Any specie© of 
animal fitting into the latter category would be selected 
out by nature and become extinct. Those in the former would 
live and pass on their characteristics to future generations. 
Occasionally, mutations would appear in a species. If the 
mutation hindered the survival of an animal, the animal 
would have little chance of living long enough to pass 
it on to the young. Even if it did succeed in propagation, 
the young inherltifogr; the debilitating gen© would have 
chances for survival certainly less than that of a beast 
not in possession of the characteristic* Eventually, animals 
in the former category would no longer inhabit the earth.
Other mutations, however, were beneficial instead of 
detrimental. A new trait emerging in an animal which would 
aid in the creature*© survival would, of course, have 
a very good possibility of being passed on to future 
generations for the same reasons a detrimental character­
istic would not. Man, too, genetically handed down trait© 
aiding hi© successor*© survival. Just as other animals, man 
is the product of a long history of evolution. The character­
istics he possesses are all in his composite make up because
as
they aided! In hie ancestors* Fight; For survival.®®
These inborn Features are not solely physical. Mental
characteristics likewise evolved from the animals* need to
live* Conscious or subconscious impulses, instinct©! drives,
needs, and actions all have a similar reason For existing.
Graham Wallas saw that®®
impulse » . * ha© an evolutionary history oF it© 
own earlier than the history oF those intellectual 
processes by which, it is often directed and modified* 
Our Inherited organisation inclines us to re-act in 
certain ways to certain stimuli because such 
reactions have been useful in the past in preserving 
our ©paeias. Some of the reactions are what w@ 
call specifically * instincts,* that is to say, im­
pulses toward definite act© or series of acts, 
independent of any conscious anticipation of their
^®Th© question of whether man ha© genetically acquired 
trait© or culturally acquired {experiential3 ones has never 
been satisfactorily answered. For various approaches to 
the question and for the application of them to politics, see! 
Alexander Alland, Jr., Evolution and Human Behavior {Garden 
City, New Jerseys The National History Press, 19673f Robert 
Audrey, African Genesis {New Yorks Dell Publishing Co.,
Inc., 1970}| Robert Andrey, The Social Contract {New Yorki 
Atheneum, 1970}; Peter Corning, "The Biological Base© of 
Behavior and Some Implication© for Political Science,** &?orld 
Pp11t1cs,XXIII {April, 19713, 381—370; Donald S. MacBae,
**Darwinism and the Concept of Social Evolution,” The British 
Journal of Sociology,X{June, 1959}, 105-113; M .F . Ashley 
Montagu, Culture and the Evolution of Man {New York;
Oxford University Press, 19683; Desmond Morris, The Human Zoo 
{New York? McGraw-Hill Book Company, 196931 Desmond Morris, 
The Naked Ape {New Yorks Dell Publishing Co., Inc., 19673; 
Albert Sorni't,' f,Towarde a More Biologically-Oriented Political 
Science,” Midwest Journal of Political Science XII {November,
19683 , 550-5671 Lionel ' Tiger, Men" in ''Groups {New Yorks Random
House, Inc., 19693; Graham Dallas, Human Nature in Politics 
{New Yorks F.S. Crofts & Co., 1981*11 Leslie A • White, The 
Evolution of Culture {New Yorks McGraw-Hill Book Company, 
Inc., 19593.
2 ®Walia©» Human Nature In Politics, pp. 48-49•
probable effects. Thee© Instincts are sometimes 
unconscious and involuntary? and sometime©, in the 
case of ourselves end apparently of other higher 
animals, they are conscious and voluntary. But 
the connection between means and end© which they 
exhibit is the result not of any contrivance by 
the actor, but of the survival, in the past, of the 
* fittest9 of many varying tendencies to act.
There have been a number of motivating drives found In
almost all animals. The need for animal group© to have
their own territory is an obvious example. Should another
group encroach upon this area, the animals will fight to
repel them* The encroaching group, on the other hand, the
farther it gets from its own territory, will come to lose
much of its self-confidence making it easier for them to be
repelled* Territoriality helps the species survive by
giving each group its own food-producing area free from
other groups*®^
Drives are evident in the creature*s uLviaus desire
to live. However, the drive to live will occasionally be
held in check when the group is threatened and an animal may
sacrifice himself because the drive for the species* survival
is even greater than the urge for life itself.
Another drive is the desire for dominance which
results in hierarchical structure© being formed.®® within
®7 Ardrey, African Genesis, pp. 35-60. 
®BIbid*, pp. 81-83*
^9 Ibld*, pp. 91-118.
animal© is found the desire to achieve high status. The 
urge, as all other©, fluctuates from animal to animal 
and Only a few have it to any great degree* These few 
will compete with each other until one alone sits a© king of 
the hill* Desire alone, of course, is not enough. Other 
skills, such as fighting ability or oratorical skill, are 
needed* In any event, a leader does arise. Below him is 
arranged a hierarchy, a "pecking order," according to 
abilities* The leader, of course, gets the choice pickings. 
At the other end of the spectrum, the individual farthest 
removed from thd leader is given the leftovers. While 
others nearer the top may occasionally challenge the leader, 
he is,on the whole, recognized as being dominant and his 
position is infrequently contested. To challenge and to 
lose could mean loss of life or exile, either of which has 
drives often stronger than the one for dominance, Which 
urge is strongest in a creature varies, and when there is a 
conflict between two or more drives, the most dominant will 
win.
The natural inclination for forming hierarchies ha© 
become a beneficial survival trait passed on to man*© de­
scendants. One man against a larger creature does not have 
much chance of success. Yet, he must kill the beast, either 
for food or to rid himself of a threat, Man, therefore, 
learned to join with other men; and in order to succeed 
in their endeavors, a leader arose and was accepted* Those
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men who were able to submits iso a leader were able tso survive
30and genetically pass on the submission trait:. Those not; 
able to do so were defeated by either human or non-human 
creatures* Anyone who has seen boys at play has seen the 
outcropping of the traits of dominance and submission as 
a leader, a captain, a quarterback is certain to emerge and 
be accepted* Also, in witnessing the Inordinate amount of 
concentration placed on presidential elections over those 
of other American elections, it becomes even clearer that 
people do Indeed have certain, inborn "biological demands 
. . . and they will continue to demand a leader in the form 
of an identifiable, solitary individual* It is a fundamental 
pattern of their species, and there is no avoiding it."®*
Since the desire for one leader came from the need to 
survive, it fluctuates according to the degree of tension 
an individual feels. When his world is most threatened, he 
will allow and actually help power to be concentrated in an 
Adolf Hitler or a Winston Churchill, when times are more 
calm, the desire for a solitary strong leader, in turn, dimin­
ishes! and a Churchill is then dismissed from his post of 
dominant power holder* In other words, it "is proportion­
al to the distress of the followers* Hence, the leader
on
* “ 0 view it from an experiential viewpoint, it is 
not difficult to see that from birth one is taught to respect 
and accept authcrity--first in the family and later in the 
larger society*
31.Morris, The Human Zoo, p. 55.
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who in fact* ©marge© wiil be considered indtspeneible toy his 
Follower©* in proportion to the magnitude of th© task at 
hand.” 32
An oligarchy possesses th© power to form policies in 
all societies. The size of the minority will vary and, at 
times, one individual will ©merge a© a dominant power holder. 
Those constituting the ruling class do so because of their 
own capabilities and desires* Th© majority of a ©tat©’© 
citizenry allow an oligarchy to rise and function because of 
their own lack of desire for power and their inborn need 
to- be led.
gp
Oankwart A. Rustow, ©d«, Philosophers and Kings 
Chaw York 2 George Braziller, 1970j, p. 31.
CHAPTER II 
FEAR AND REACTION
Public policy primarily emanates From the province 
oF a Few individuals. An understanding of what lies behind 
the policies can only be discovered by an examination of 
those figures. The effort must be made to look beyond the 
exterior countenance of the possessor© of power and bring 
to light their innermost recesses. Only in the turbulent 
inner area can one try to decipher whet it is that causes 
man to act. Somewhere within the power holder are found 
motivation© which were placed within him at his conception, 
drives which were experientially spawned, and reasons for 
existing which he ha© formulated* These motivations, drives, 
and reasons all have direct application to why public 
policy occurs. Investigation© into the inner sector of man 
must be preceded by the reminder that what is located and 
called truth Is done so only with the belief of there being 
no absolutes in this complex world, least of all in its 
moat complex ersature— men. But only by attempting to 
understand the individual's thought© and drives, can one come 
to know man. And only if one knows man, can one know hi© 
policies*
In the previous chapter, mention was made of theories
3a
of man biological in nature* These thoughts held roan, like 
all animals, evolved out of a struggle for survival* He 
had desires to live--►drives to live--genetically passed to 
him by his ancestors* From the drive to live came men’s 
need for a leader* and other mental and physical survival 
mechanisms* In what is certainly overly simplistic logic, 
life is in essence survival* To maintain existence is to 
meet and overcome threats to existence* Man needs food to 
live* He will devote his mind and body to surmount anything 
menacing his food supply* He will do likewise to any chal­
lenge that may, or actually does, block any of the other 
needs or drives he feels must be preserved for his continued 
survival* The basic underlying point needing to be ©tressed 
is man does realize the presence of threats to his existence* 
He sees obstacles strewn along the path of hi© life and 1© 
afraid*
The need for a leader has been passed down through 
generations of mankind as a result of the struggle for 
survival. In the same manner* the ability to fear has been 
Implanted in man’s mind, and it has been a prime explanation 
for man’s survival* Fear keeps man from risking his life 
unnecessarily• Fear gives man the time to plan how to 
react to a threatening situation* James C* Qsvieseven ©hows
1 Supra, pp. S©**29.
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that Fear, in marginal etuantitles, must: be preeertt For mart 
t:o act: at all * While extreme Fear is recognized as being 
detrimental in often leaving one so distraught he would be 
unable to act, a complete absence oF Fear will make one tin* 
aware oF the threat or the need to act at all.^
An array in combat will Find after a Few engagements 
it is in some ways better in condition than it was beFor© 
physical conflict» because it now possesses experienced 
Fighting personnel. but let war drag on without any new 
inFusion of replacements in its ranks, and the army will 
likely lose much of its vitality. In any list oF reasons 
explaining the happening, room would have to be made For the 
presence oF Fear. It is the so-called #*fearless” soldiers 
who will ©park the troop© and at the same time put their 
own lives into extreme danger. They will eventually come to 
lose those lives, and the array*© driving Force will be 
similarly lost. It is th© First to take cover, to Feel 
Fear, who remain alive.
Fear is a survival mechanism Found in every person.
As each person is in someway© different, so, too, is his abil­
ity to Fear and the causes of those Fears. Fear comes 
about as the result of the knowledge something one considers 
important is threatened. Fear of losing this something 
stirs man to act or not to act. Fear 1© the cause behind
p
□avies, Human Nature in Politics, pp. S8-69.
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man* © motivation--behind the reason© of a leader*© issuance 
of public policies# As Robert Ardrey ha© written, "The 
world of the animal is a world of fear.**^ The world of the 
power holder is no different*
The ability to fearj the drive© for dominance, territory 
obtainment and defense5 and the need for leadership have all 
been genetically pre-coded into every man*© system. Their 
beneficiality to the human animal has bean explained* In 
attempting to discern man*© basic nature, these characteris­
tic© must be examined* Other traits do certainly exist*
One of the most important of these ha© been the ability 
of an individual to learn from hi© own and other*© experiences. 
The latter fact allows a person to gain knowledge of the 
surrounding environment from on©*© contemporaries and, more 
importantly, from one’s elders* In phrases reminiscent of 
others previously stated, man’s ffcultural capacities evolved 
because they enhanced the ability of Chi© 3 ancestors to ©ur- 
vive.*'4
A person, then, i© able to absorb and comprehend 
instructions as to what he should fear. He is influenced 
by planned example* As a child, he is told to fear the 
touch of fire. He may touch it anyway, but he will do so
3Ardrey, African Genesis, p • 60*
^Corning, Biological Bases, p. 338*
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only with some measure of apprehension. Then, in learning 
his elders were correct: in this on© instance, the child*® 
questioning of other lesson© will be dulled. The Fear of a 
possible deprivation also motivates the person to listen to 
and obey other teachings. Th© result© of these planned 
cultural admonishments will have a long term affect upon the 
human personality and the motivations of hi© later actions. 
Each child, of course, is taught differently and with diverse 
examples giving each person a separate and distinctive per­
sonality just as there is some heterogeneity in the genes 
each individual inherits.
Not all learned instruction is accepted as planned.
The person*© own individual conception of what he is taught 
gives him his own explanation of the world. Also, not all of 
the input into a child*© mind is planned by his eiders.
Often unoontrived experience©, and the resulting answers man*s 
mind forces him to search for to explain fearful phenomena, 
shape hi© view of the surrounding environment and hi® piece 
in it. Once again, the view is different for each persons 
and while all motivations do have fear as a foundation, in 
other regard© the drives vary from person to person.
Not only do man*© motives vary, but so, too, do the 
actions he has been taught, and he ha® discovered on hi© own, 
to execute when faced with a threat. Mi© oholee of response 
is either dictated by what experience has shown was the beet 
method to defeat the threat, or what would be th© consequences 
of failure to act or not to act. The Spartan child in
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Plutarch*© Lives allowed a Fox he had stolen and hidden under 
his coat: to disembowel him rather then make a move that 
would betray himselF.® Experience had shown him whippings 
and shame would be the consequences heaped upon him should 
he show a sign of weakness* Faced with two threats*--the 
Fox and punishment— he suFFered the necessary result oF 
not acting upon what he considered to be the lesser menace*
He Feared and he reacted by doing nothing. His action 
relieved the major Fear that he Felt* And,recalling Davies, 
man acts only out oF Fean.
The heterogeneous experiences and conceptions roan 
has, when applied to the atmosphere of th© Leviathan, 
show that, "political reaction is Far more personal, Far less 
abstract and ideological, than either students oF citizenry 
or citizen© themselves are wont to recognize. * . . CTjhe 
eFFect oF words is Far less than th© individual experience 
. . . oF assorted end intensely Felt deprivations."®
It is to those deprivations Harold Lasswell Focused 
upon in an attempt to explain man*© political behavior*
Using Freudian concepts, Lasswell Felt th© experiences oF 
a child will be reFlected in his adult actions when Faced 
with the real world* IF a child receives something having
®Plutarchus, Lives* in Plutarch*© Lives, trans• by 
John Dryden, revised by A.H. Clough, I CBostpns Little,
Brown and Company, 1924], p. 100.
®Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p* 189*
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good connotations for him, he will react, e.g. smile, 
when he discovers it is nothing to fear. If he fears a 
loss of something, he likewise will react, e.g. throw a 
tantrum. In essence, there is a power relationship where 
"extreme deprivations are threatened or inflicted against a 
challenger| and what the infant-child does initially is to 
treat every discomfort as a provocation for every form of 
expression at hi© command, jtt i^© not too far fetched to say 
that everyone is born a politician, and most . , • outgrow it
Why has th© politician-—-the power holder— failed to 
outgrow It?
Lasswell would ©ay in answer there were certain in­
fluences in the childhood of the power holder causing him
)■
to have feelings needing expression. In later life, he die-
r
placed these private motives upon public object© and ration­
alized the displacement In terms of public interest.8 To give 
an example, a child may come to fear and hate his father as 
the result of an oedipal complex. As he grows older, the 
child will transfer the hate for his father— for authority—  
into a public figure, such as a king. He will come to ration­
alize any of his following attack© upon the monarch by saying 
he did it to help free the enslaved people of his country*
^Harold 0. Lasswell, Power and Personality [New Yorkt 
W.N. Norton S Company, Inc., 19481, pp. 159-160.
8Sees Harold 0. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics 
CNew Yorkt The Viking Pres©, 19621} and his Power and 
Personality.
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TH# successful seekers of power move From ore socle!
\
ststus -to another**From outsider© to oligarchs* Fear caused 
these move©, and because oF being placed into a strange and 
therefore uncomfortable environment, Fear also resulted From 
it* Failure to satisfy a need In their youth or adolescence 
caused these move© and PI eft permanent, active [benign or 
malignant} lesion© that kept these men in tension Forever 
after*M^ MThe power seeker • * * pursues power as means of 
compensation against deprivation* Power is expected to over* 
cone low estimates'of the self, by changing either th© traits 
of self or the environment in which it Function©*”*® These 
personal Fear© are the causes For the reactions that become 
public policy*
Harold Lasswell has effectively applied the impact of 
personality to the political world*** Even if one was to
%3avies, Human Nature In Politics, p. 95*
*®Laeew©ll, Power and Personality, p. '39.
^*Lasswell is not alone in writing on th© topic• A list 
of two-hundred, thirty books was already compiled in 1956 
dealing with the authoritarian personality alone* Seel Rich-* 
ard Christie and Peggy Cook, "A Guide to Published Literature 
Relating to the Authoritarian Personality through 19SS,” 
Journal of Psychology, XLV [April, 195©}, 171-199• For more 
generaT discussion on the subject,- see: Fred I* 'Oreenstein,
wThe Impact of Personality on Polibices An Attempt to Clear 
Away Underbrush,” American Political Science Review, LXJ 
[September, 1967}, 639-641$ Fred I* Sreensteln, ”Personality 
and Poiiticslf, American Behavioral Scientist, XI [Noveiuber- 
December, 1967},r Leroy N* Rleselback and George I. 
Belch, Psychology and Politics [New Yorks Holt, Rinehart and 
Winston, Inc*, 1969 jT
disregard the biologist© 1 theories on genetic pre-coding of
characteristics, those who have made studies such as Lass-
well1© help In substantiating Fear as the cause oF public
policy. Most of those studies treating a combination of
personality and politics, deal with the attacker of authority
— the seeker of power. Yet, whet should happen to him
should he succeed and Find himself a© the new Father Figure?
The corsepenting uneasiness is easy to understand.
As mentioned above, Fear both caused his move© and resulted
From them. The biologists have described the inborn need
For a leader* Because a seeker answers what For him is a
more pressing drive, does not eliminate his need to be led*
The need should be expected to be Found in everyone, including
the dominant power holder, Fear results when that need is
not met, Erich Fromm also pointed out the tension Felt
when one is in a threatening situation and has no higher
authority to which be can turn. Certainly, a power holder is
constantly Faced with threats* Thomas Hobbes actly described
the situationi ■
During the time men live without a common Power to 
keep them all in awe, they are in that condition 
which is called Warref and such a warre, as 1© of 
©very man, againet ©very men, , • , [Such time© Find© 
one in) continual! Feare, and danger of violent 
death| And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish, end short.
i&Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan [New Yorks E*P, Dutton and 
Company, Inc,, 19501, pp. iQ3-l&4.
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As Hobbes Further noted, for* the head of a state, there is 
no power to keep him in awe.i 3 He is In "eontlnuall fear®.” 
And when in fear the phiid, or the dominant power holder, re­
acts.
What are those fears that haunt the power holder and 
cause him to react? What fears motivate and influence hia 
public policies?
The first and foremost urge in man is to survive.
The genetically pre-coded drive is obvious in all creatures* 
Without the urge to live, man would have long ago become 
extinct. The fear for the survival of self, then, is th© 
single-most prominent trait in man. In a physical sense, one 
would expect to find in everyone both th© desire to live 
and th© anxiety that life may fa© taken away# Fear for life, 
then, is one Feature having a bearing upon the formulation r. ~ 
of public policy.
However, the fear for one1® survival is not limited 
toe a physical self. Included within the need to survive is 
an individual*s mental self as well* Each p©reon--each 
personality--needs certain things to make himself whole. Only 
fay answering those hereditary and experiential drives which 
move his soul can the power seeker find hie true ©elf. Self- 
actual ization is the goal moving him to attack authority and
l3 Ibid., p. IPS
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•take power far himself *1^
far each man there are certain intangibles he desires 
to acquire--he must acquire* These are the things that 
”mak© life worth living*” Once they are acquired, the men 
is whole* His self is actualized* He lives and has m 
whole self worth conserving* Man now fears for his survival*
It i© the separate fear of not grasping those intangibles-- 
and thus one*© ©elf— that spurs men to action in an effort 
to acquire them* Once possession of these incorporeal sub­
stances— and one*a ©elf— is accomplished, man acts to insure 
their survival* Any threat to hi© tangible or intangible 
self causes fear in man*© heart and he will react* He 
knows If those things are lost, so, too, is he*
The true power seeker is differantiated from hie fellow 
man by his Inner need for power* In order to actualize hi© 
true ©elf, and thereby be something worth saving, the seeker 
must grasp the power, the seat of authority, the leadership*
There are naturally going to be others who will compete
with him for the prize* Yet, he will compete. He will make
any sacrifice to achieve his goal, because for him "power
Ci©3 the magic potion that £pan3 change poverty to wealth,
failure to success, crime to virtue, and ignorance to brillianoe.,,*s
l^for the explanation of self-actualization which has 
influenced this line of thought, sees Davis's, Human Nature 
in Politics, pp. 53-60.
l®Nenad 0* Popovic, Yugoslavia? The New Class in Crisis 
CSyracuse, New York? Syracuse University Press, 19633, p. IS.
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This is the power seeker*® destiny. Never to have Fulfilled 
it, i© never to heve lived.
While it i© the drive for power which separatee th© 
leader from his followers, the leader also has imbedded 
within himself other need© that must be satisfied in order 
for self-aotuaiizetion to be accomplished. Even should the 
seeker grasp his Golden Fleece of supreme power, should his 
other needs fail to be satisfied,}he will still not be a 
complete self. Once any needs are acquired, they must be 
preserved in order to remain viable. Whether or not one ever 
achieves ail of his goals is a point th&t can be debated.
Yet, a© each goal is reached, each need fulfilled, man 
stands nearer to being whoie— perhap© not in the eye© of 
others, but at least within his own mind’s eye. Each cap­
tured desire must be retained. If it is lost, one is even 
less of a whole self than he was when he had it but still 
lacked the main goal of hi© sights.
For example, why was Napoleon exiled to Elba and St.
Helena?
The basic reason was **without his adoring public, he 
could not so irrepressibly wage war and conquer nations. in 
short, by removing him from France and hi© adoring public, 
he was made into somebody other than Napoleon.*1*®
*®Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 277.
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Fear of never achieving his goals, as well as fear 
of losing those already acquired, force© “the power holder 
to act— to make public policy. He fears for position, 
acceptance, esteem,1egacy, creation, power, charisma, and 
ideology. He reacts.
CHAPTER III 
FEAR FOR LIFE
The desire For life--that on© supreme motivating
Factor which has shaped and governed man’s existence--is
present in ail men. So, too, is the Fear of the physical
self being returned to the dust From which it came. However,
each man, though realizing immortality in an earthly sense
is impossible, tries to Forget th© approaching darkness.
He undertake© various pursuit© to occupy hiroeelf and tries
to remove thought© of the unavoidable demise from hi© mind.
Man will find an^
activity in which the individual happily loses 
himself— getting so absorbed that, at certain times 
and in some situations, he is able to forget himself 
in the performance of activity which he enjoys 
primarily for its own sake and not primarily because 
he thereby feeds or protects himself, hi© family, 
hi© community-—or because he can give socially 
acceptable vent to hi© aggressions, gain great 
deference, or bend people to his will.
For some, the activity is th© seeking and holding power.
On the face of it, it would appear as if a person
with a healthy desire to live should be expected to find an
occupation other than politics. For the power seeker, th©
percentage© in favor of a long life would seem to greatly
diminish if he is victorious in his quest. The dominant
^Davies, Human Nature in Politics, p. 59.
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power holder, especially, is the target of many latent 
Frustrations. For those who despise the Father --Figure and 
For those who seek his position, the sword has been believed 
to be often a more effective tool than the ballot box in 
removing the leader From his position.
What Fear the power holder does possess in regard 
to his life is more oF a Fear For his position--his actualized 
selF--than For his physical 1 i Fe. The assassin does not 
attack an Abraham Lincoln or a William McKinley. He attacks 
a President Lincoln or a President McKinley'. As Harold 
Lasswell pointed out, the assassin pulls the trigger, not 
on the average citizen, but on the Father-authoritarian- 
Figure. It is the position the power holder represents 
that is murdered, not th© person. When a Czar Nicholas II 
or an Emperor MaxemiIlian Is overthrown and then executed,
It is because, by holding the positions they do, they stand 
in th© path oF the power seekers who can only actualize 
their individual selves by permanently removing these ob­
stacle© i to their destiny. One© again, it is the position, 
not the individual, upon which Frustration and hpt© has been 
directed. IF Fear For physical liFe was Found to be the 
most pressing drive within the power holder, he would be 
expected to remove himself From offio© and thus From the 
Focal point of enmity and danger to his person.
However, he does not do so. For hi© self to be whole 
he must retain his position. Only then is he a true self
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worth preserving. Then, the Fear For liFe will emerge. He 
will react to protect himsolF by either ignoring the threat, 
removing himself From it, taking steps to eliminate it, or 
combinationscoF all three tactics.
Whether or not the Fear for life is present to any 
great extent within a leader, in the first place, will be 
the result not only of the present environment, but of the 
method by which power was initially acquired and later 
tained. IF the throne was attained and, or held by violent 
methods, e.g., in Russia, this gives an acceptability For 
such techniques to other power seekers. They will use 
similar methods themselves* The realization oF possible 
physical attack will necessarily cause concern within a 
power holder. In nations with a strong heritage oF legal 
or traditional pathways to power, e.g., Britain, there would 
however be little anxiety concerning attempts to take the 
power holder* s life by the seekers. There will always be 
some Fear of the assassin, along with the realization that 
little can be done about it. However, what would happen if, 
in the case of John Kennedy, the bullet had merely grazed 
him? Would the legally elected President then have become 
more Fearful and taken steps to withdraw From possible 
threats?
Ghana*s Kwame Nkrumeh was an Individual who did 
attempt to hide From his Fear* His life came to be in danger} 
he Feared For it. Yet, he refused to relinquish his position.
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The result was that he isolated himself in Christianborg 
Castle in an effort to escape the assassin’s bullet* He 
became dependent upon hie Friends end conflicting intel­
ligence agencies For information. Those Friends and agencies, 
seeking power For themselves, only gave Nkrumah information 
thought to be pleasing to him and thereby receive his Favor 
in return, or information which would discredit their
O
rivals. Nkrumah*s Fear For life caused him to rely on 
others who sought power. He was afraid to go into the 
country and seek the truth with his own eyes* As with 
Kwame Nkrumah, the Fear For life is not often reflected 
directly in public policies. Action is usually reserved 
For different anxieties, such as the Fear For position.
The indirect effect of the Fear for life is mostly seen in 
itsJ influence on the source of information upon which the 
power holder bases his policies.
When tension is high over the belief his life is In 
danger, the power holder will often remove himself from the 
real world and be forced to rely upon power seekers for 
information. To be forced to see the world through the eyes 
of another is dangerous for the holder of power. His personal 
instincts brought him his position and are now dulled. His 
senses which have a *,FeeiT, for what is occurring in his
2w. Howard Wriggims, The Ruler’s Imperative CNew York t 
Columbia University Press, 196937"P • i&4.'
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nation are likewise removed From direct stimulation. The 
Fear For liFe may thereby shape policies that have unFavoretole 
reactions among the populace and, or the powerFul groups.
The position oF power will then be threatened by their die* 
satisFaction.°
A diFFerent indirect influence of the Fear For life 
upon public policy is possibly seen in the case of AdoIF 
Hitler* Hitler was often in ill health and Felt that his 
life would be short. Once he consented to being examined 
by a Or. Theodor Morel!• The results oF Following the 
doctor*a advice brought the German dictator temporary relief 
and he was Forever after of the opinion that Morell was a 
miracle worker* in actuality, the doctor was giving Hitler 
a wide variety of injections oF questionable medical value.
A number of Hitler’s intimates later Felt that their leader 
had undergone a change after Falling under the doctor’s 
spell* The result was all of Hitler’s later maneuvers were 
the supposed consequences of Morell’s medications.^
For the power holder who has used violence as a tool, 
Fear For life may be directly reflected in some of his public 
policies. Nikita Khrushchev has mentioned Stalin’s anxiety
^The problem of isolation will oocur also For reasons 
other than the Fear For life. Sees Seedy* Twilight.
^Albert Speer, Inside the Third Reich, trans. by 
Richard Winston and Clara Winston CNew Yorks Avon Books, 
1971), pp. 1S2-156. Speer himself doubts this thesis, 
however, Feeling what Hitler did would have been done even 
if he had not had any Injections.
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over hi© own safety.® Part of the fear was the result of
the growing rivalry of Beria, the powerful head of the
Soviet’s secret polios.®
Stalin started to worry about Beria*© increasing 
influence. More than that, Stalin started to fear 
Beria. . . .  The practical means for achieving 
Stalin’s goals were all in Beria*© hands. Stalin 
realized that if Beria could eliminate anyone at whom 
Stalin pointed hi© finger, then Beria could also 
eliminate someone of his own choosing, on his own 
initiative. Stalin feared that he would be the first 
person Beria might choose.
Stalin’s reaction was to try and rid himself of the threat.
,ti/
Realizing that the head of the secret police was a Mingrel,
Stalin published a decree saying that the Hingrels 
had connection© with the Turks, and that some of them 
were politically oriented toward Turkey. Of course 
the allegation was utter nonsense. Because Stalin 
was old and sick, he wasn’t consistent in following 
through on his scheme. Beria turned the whole thing 
around in hi© favor and shrewdly insinuated himself 
as Stalin’s henchman. . . . Beria assigned himself to
go to Seorgia and administer the punishment of the 
Mingrels, the imaginary enemies. Those poor fellows 
were led to the slaughter like sheep.
The impact of the fear for life on public policies is 
not great enough to cause the power holder to completely 
remove himself from danger by resigning hi© office. Often, 
such fear is not even found to be great enough to have
®Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. by 
Strobe Talbott CNew York: Bantam BooksTJ 19713, pp. 319-321.
6Ibid., p. 335.
7Ibid., p. 336,
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any impact on public policy at: ail, and it will b© ignored* 
But if tbs anxiety is of any magnitude, the power holder 
may coma to laolat© him©©if and thereby be forced-' to rely 
on- second-hand information to formulate hi© policies* Me 
may even act directly to eliminate the <mu«« of hi© distress 
and construct policies having direct influence upon the live# 
of man*
CHAPTER IV 
FEAR FOR POSITION
The ©elF-righteous, confident and egocentric power 
seeker is motivated by inner drives he cannot fully compre­
hend. He only know© the prize of power lies within his 
reach and it must be captured in order to find self- 
fulfillment. When he finally achieves his goal and grasp© 
power, much, if not all, of his personal ambition© become 
accomplished. Yet the power holder, be he ©imply oligarch 
or dominant leader, realizes the presence of other© who have 
the desire to supplant him and whose hunger for power is 
of no less a quantity then hi© was. With the first flush of 
success, the new power holder feel© omnipotent. However, the 
world doe© not sit ©till while h© luxuriate© in hi© new 
found self. He must produce answers to problems before the 
power seeker© do or he will find hi© support drifting away. 
Mened 0. Popovic in writing of the Communist Yugoslavian 
oligarchy Cthe new class] says:*
Individual© belonging to the new class have various 
and even mutually oonfliotlng interests. Nevertheless, 
each is dependent on the group as a whole in order 
to achieve his respective degree of authority. . . .  
Although united by common goals and enemies, new-class
^■Popovic, The New Class In Crisis, p. 13.
member© differ in that some are deeply committed to 
the new class, others less deeply committed# Ail, 
however, are frightened of losing whatever authority 
they possess*
They, as do all power holders, fear the loss of their position 
W* Howard Wriggins devotes his book, The Ruler*© Imperative, 
to the problem as applied to the leaders of Africa and Asia*
He aptly point© out, "if it were possible to measure the 
attention a ruler gives to different problems, it could prob­
ably be shown that he devotes more time and effort to aggrega­
ting ©round himself and his government sufficient political 
power to permit him to stay on top than to any other ©ingle 
purpose.**^ It is the position of power which places the 
oligarch high above the masses* To lose the position is to 
lose the whole self— to no longer be completely alive# The 
power holder fears such a loss as he would fear for hi© 
physical self and he reacts* He attempts to eliminate his 
opponents, reassure his allies, and sway the majority to 
allow him to retain power.
Not© should be made her© of the term position. It 
refers to both the Internal position of power held by man, e*g 
heed of a nation or member of Congress, and also to the ex­
ternal position of the oligarch*© country, e.g., threatened 
by invasion or supreme in the world* If the nation*© 
position falls, so, too, does hi© personal position. To
^Wrigglns, The Ruler*s Imperative, p. 11.
remain In power then, the holder must have success in both 
world and domestic affairs. To fail In either realm is to 
provide the seeker© with a lever which can be used to pry 
the holders from power. The holder© realize their predica­
ment and feel afraid. In response to the fear, the power 
holders often will attempt to remove, damage or alter the 
fear*© stimulus— the power seeker.®
The technique of exiling opponents ha© long been 
employed to eliminate threats. But it is the use of a 
”nlght of long knives” to destroy any threats to a power 
holder’s position that is deemed the ultimate response. One 
obvious ”night” occurred in Nazi Germany* Hitler’s status in 
the early 1330’s was far from secure* The Sturmabteilung CS.A.3 
had been an aid in helping him to gain office, but now It 
reverted to a threat to his power. The storm troopers had be­
lieved Hitler’s promise of remaking Germany into a true 
nationalist-socialist state* They had believed and they were 
growing restless waiting for results. Rivalry between 
those long-time Hitler followers and the German army was 
likewise present* Hitler’s future plans depended greatly 
upon the army’s support. The S.A. thus became a menace 
to Hitler’s position, for if their desires were acceded to,
®See Ibid., pp. 159—180. As Thomas Hobbes said in 
his Leviathan, p. 102, ”There is no way for any man to 
secure himself©, so reasonable, as Anticipationj that is, by 
force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so 
long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger 
him.”
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Hitler*© position would be placed in great; jeopardy both from
those who could not; stomach the coarse methods the storm
troopers employed and From the S. A. itselF* On June 30,
1934, Hitler acted and with hi© more trustworthy SohutgstaFFel
CS.S.3 executed the leading elements of the S . A Hitler
had removed th© threat to his position causing him to
become ^extremely excited and * • • Inwardly convinced that
he had com© through a great danger*”® He knew the threat was
no longer to be feared*
The Stalinist purges are similar proof that when an
oligarch senses threats to his position, he will unleash
a© much of the power at his command as is necessary to
eliminate it. Khrushchev wrote
All of us around Stalin were temporary people. As 
long as he trusted us to a certain degree, we were 
allowed to go on living and working• But the moment 
he stopped trusting you, Stalin would start to
William L* Shlrer , The Rise and,. Fall of the Third 
Reich CGreenwich, Connecticut ? Fawcett Pub1icatioris,'' ino.« 
19623, p. 87*
5Speer, Inside, p * 87.
®Khrushchev, Remembers, pp• 329-330• Recall, also, the 
actions taken by Herod when told of th© birth of a new king* 
Another example of violent elimination of a threat to 
protect position can be found in the executions undertaken 
by L,-.« 5udsr.es© leadership of the member© of an attempted 
1971 coup, ”Sbowdown Season in the Middle East— Sudan,” 
Newsweek, August 2, 1971, pp. 34-35; and in the Jordanian 
attacks upon the Palestinian commandos, Eric Pace, ”Jordan 
Acknowledge© Clash in Effort to Oust Guerrillas from 
Inhabited Areas,” New York Times, July 15, 1971, p. 7*
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scrutinize you until the cup of his distrust over­
flowed. Then It would tee your* turn to follow those 
who were no longer among the living*
Complete and final elimination of a threat will not
always prove to be the best course to take* Bloodletting
in order to remove e threat, even if done only according to
accepted legal practice, can often sponsor the rise of a
new and more pressing danger* Actual us© of violence may
have th© result of bringing a power holder*© own name into
disrepute and making him into a target for suspicion rather
than trust* The use of violence may also make a former
enemy into a martyr and provide a cause round which other
power seeker© will be able to gather adherents to employ
against the oligarchy*
The power holder will attempt to reverse roles to
avoid such an occurrence* H© will portray himself as the
oppressed and the power seeker a© the "enemy of the state*"
Since the state is supposedly the composite populace, the
seeker is ©aid to be the "enemy of the people,” and the
power holder, then, become© th© people*© protector. Th©
method damage© a power seeker end can be as effective a
tool as elimination. A© an example, an oligarch of the
American South will portray Abraham Lincoln as a baboon.
An oligarch of the North will portray Jefferson Davis as a
Simon Legree* Both actions are devised to damage a seeker
and turn potential support away from the camp of the power
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holder*® opposition.
The opposition’s freedom of speech also is controlled 
by holding "discipline and subordination . • . C'to be) in***
dispensible to the very existence of the Cstate)*"® To 
©peak against the oligarchs is to speak against the people, 
and the seeker is thereby appropriately punished if hi should 
undertake those improprieties. Anyone seen associating 
with a threat is also openly or covertly punished* The 
Russian novelist, Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn, whose work© 
often portray the ugliness of Soviet society, is looked 
upon by the Russian oligarchy as a definite menace. The 
Soviet oligarchs react by refusing to publish his writings, 
refusing his friends* work, holding his name up for disre­
pute, and making it seemingly impossible for him to receive 
hi© awarded Nobel Prize. As is seen in Solzhenitsyn, a 
threat is not always recognized as coming from a true power* 
seeker. Yet the oligarchy views Solzhenitsyn*s writing© as 
damaging to their status. And since power fades when damaged, 
Solzhenitsyn is punished.^
'rhe tactic has often been used in Communist state© 
to label a regime*© opponents a© "revisionist." Oan Morgan, 
"Poles Applaud Gierek* s Plan," Washington Post, Febr• 9,
1971, p. A9•
®Michels, Political Parties. P* 177.
^Solzhenitsyn Complains of Police Harassment, Surveil­
lance," Washington Post, April 3, 1972, p. A16. Similar methods 
have been employed in Greece. "How the Colonel© Run Things," 
Newsweek, January 19, 197D, pp. 32-37.
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Other times, attempts will foe made to turn enemies 
into neutral entities, if* not actual allies. As noted, the 
position of state must foe preserved to protect the position 
of power holder* Therefore, a Hitler will sign a treaty 
with his mortal enemy Stalin to remove the threat of Russian 
arms from forcing Germany to fight a two-front war. A 
Richard Nixon, who is looked upon as the arch enemy of 
communism, will journey to Chin© and face the leaders of 
what was one© considered the nRed Menace” in order to help 
possibly check a growing Soviet threat felt toy both China and 
the United States.*®
Threats can also be met by means other than an after- 
the-fact action. Machiavelii writes of King Ferdinand of 
Spain who kept threats from arising by undertaking numerous 
surprising maneuvers "which have kept hi© subjects* minds 
uncertain and astonished, and occupied in watching their 
results. And these actions have arisen one out of the other, 
so that they have left no time for men to settle down and 
act against him.”**
To keep opponent© from coming into being, numerous tactics
*®To meet a possible American threat to Canada, the 
Canadian Prim® Minister has sought closer relation© with the 
Soviet Union* Anthony Astrachan, "Trudeau Seeks Soviet Ties, 
Cites Perils to Canada,” Washington Post, May SI, 1971, p. Al.
**Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 110. Recall, also, the 
suddenness of Richard Nixon’s action© in unveiling hi© intended 
trip to China and the instituting of the wage-price freeze.
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other than those used by Ferdinand* also have been initiated* 
The primary method is to show the people it is simply more 
profitable to be the oligarch's ally than it is to be his 
enemy. While pain is inflicted upon the enemy, rewards 
will be provided for the faithful.
Gaetano Mosea has described the unlikelihood of an 
oligarch appearing unless an effective minority within the 
state's upper echelon support© him.^ Th© minority must 
be kept loyal to the power holder if he is to retain his 
position. The power holder will thus show his gratitude 
to his supporters. He will allow a close ally to have a 
few minor favor© bestowed upon him, or the power holder may 
even allow the decadence of a Hermann Goering to go unchecked. 
As the time for Abraham Lincoln's reelection in 1864 drew 
near, h© too felt apprehension concerning his ability to 
retain his position. To hold the needed support of the 
Radical Republican© in securing the nomination of his 
party, Lincoln bowed to their demand calling for the removal 
of Montgomery Blair from the office of Postmaster General.
The President wrote Blairs "You very well know that this 
proceeds from no dissatisfaction of mine with you personally
^See Wriggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, pp. 145-158.
i^Mosca, The Ruling Class, p. 53.
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or of fieislly **f^  Public policy was made under the vital 
oopsIderatIon© of fear for position, then, when Lincoln 
rewarded the requests of the Radical Republicans*
Other less 'important supporters are ©lac rewarded*
While. Individually holding only minor power, they collect 
tivaly could pose a serious challenge if not induced to 
remain faithful* Lincoln again provides a good example in 
sending a message to hie Secretary/of the Navy,, Bideon 
Welles, which reflected 'hie- desire to reward his minor 
supporter© *
M# de Hpreil who bears this, is the Editor of the 
Massager-*Franco— Americ®in Celc*'3» a Prench Newspaper 
published in the City of New York, which has 
sustained the Union cause during this war with great 
ability and energy*
I hope that any advertising which can legally 
and appropriately given to a journal of hi© else©, 
may be given to M. Moral1*
Attempts t© gain backing from certain groups within 
a etata are ©ometlfnee made by exalting a member of the group 
into the ranks of the visible oligarchy* In the American 
context, the post office department ha© been used, on 
©cession, as a political plum which is given to such groups• 
When John Kennedy first constructed hie cabinet, he desired 
it to be representative of the various sections of the 
country* Th© time came to ©elect m Postmaster General|
^Abraham Lincoln, The Collected Work® of Abraham 
Lincoln, ed* by Roy P. Basier, VIII (New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
Ii5§I, p;.18*
15Ibld., p. 343.
and since the west coast had yet to be represented on the 
cabinet, "word went out to dig up a California feusineseman* 
Someone suggested d« Edward Cay of Prudential Insurance * * « * 
Hie credent isle eppesrsd good, end Hie rather Hasty appoints 
ment • * . completed the Kennedy cabinet .f,^ &
The carrot thus ia often looked upon as a much acre 
valuable instrument then the stick* Hungary1*© Janos feeder 
and Ca:echoslov®kia*e CSuetav Hueek both came to power fol­
lowing the destruction of popular movement* in their reapactive 
countries by the Soviet military, loth Kedar and Huesk were 
in tenuous positions# knowing there was little support 
amongst the people for them. Their biggest desire was*, if 
nothing else# to neutralise the feelings of the Hungarians 
and the ©techs* They desired to keep the people from being, 
dissatisfied enough to rally behind an Issue the power holders 
could have eliminated end overthrow! the oligarchy. Kedar and 
Husak thus sew to the pi a© log of large supplies of con­
sumer goods in their nations* shops believing She* in seeing 
to the .materiel dee ires of a people, it to- see to their 
pel it leal needs* Mhlle feeder end Musak mmy never be able 
to receive widespread popular suppers# they have allayed 
dissatisfaction against themselves* *7
Arthur M. Schleeinger, Jr., A Thousand Osya [Greenwich, 
Connect lout i fassets Publication*, inoTT^IsEfTt P* 14©*
if©speed Ceruther*, "Hueek Poliowe itmgarlan Line to 
Strenghten Ceic.3 €*#ch Control,H Washington Poet, ©as* 18,
197©, p. A10* In this reel®, the peSpie do'^heve a voice*
SI
The power seeker occasionally even will be allowed to 
Join the ranks of the oligarchy. The reigning power holder© 
recognize a threat met in this manner Force© the power seeker 
to became a defender, rather than an attacker of th© ruling 
class. The Republican Richard Nixon*s selection of powerful 
Democrat John Connelly to hold an important cabinet post, is 
a possible example of the practice in action.*-® However, 
"every oligarch is full of suspicion towards those who aspire 
tc enter its ranks, regarding them not ©imply as eventual 
heirs but as successor© who are ready to supplant them with­
out waiting for natural death."*-®
Flagrant reward, also, can be a© dangerous as excessive 
employment of violence. Dissatisfaction can arise among those 
who do not benefit from the oligarch©* generosity when they 
see favors given to their own competitors. They may then 
become opponent© to the oligarchy and different policies
Following riots Poland lowered food prices. "Poland Revoking 
Increase," Washington Post, Febr. 16, 1971, p. Al5 and Tunisia*s 
leader removed an unpopular aid. ”L*Affaire Ben Salah," 
Newsweek, May 4, 1970, pp. 45-48. Sweden*© ruling party is 
ideologically opposed to monarchy and is preparing to remove 
all powers from the country*© king. Yet, the actions will 
not be undertaken until after the present, popular king 
dies in order to avoid giving an Issue around which the 
power seeker© can rally support. "Swedes Propose New Consti­
tution," New York Time®, August 89, 1971, p. 4.
*-®"Mr. Nixon Enlists a Texas Democrat," Newsweek,
Oecember SB, 1970, pp. 13-15.
*-®Michels, Political Parties, p. 176*
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will have tie be constructed to deal with the mew threat 
coming from those who were ignored.
Rather than always attempting to secure position 
through the use of physical or material considerations, the 
power holder often will try to make use of the spiritual.
Just as early kings claimed the legitimacy of their rule by 
divine right, the power holder will attempt to gain alle­
giance, and thereby support for hi© position, by inculcating 
an ideology, with provisions supporting the right of the 
oligarchy to rule, within the populace. Ideology believed 
bring® a ruling class vast power in its ability to roue© th© 
normally apathetic. Conflict over power forces both seeker? 
and holder to construct chains of thought which will bring 
as many under their spell as possible. They know their 
effectiveness in this regard determines whether "they may 
stand or fail in th© rough struggle© in which they engage."^®
Ideology is constructed to attack or protect the 
oligarchs, not to give the rivals a reason for being. Th© 
opponents have found their meaning for life in the desire 
for status--power is their god, With ideology being but a 
tool, it is understandable why the Yugoslavian ruling class 
"is so sincerely concerned with its struggle for survival 
that it is capable, if necessary, of abandoning world
^Merriair, Political Power, p, 37,
S3
S'lcommunism to safeguard its own.M&i
The fear For position produced similar reaction in the 
early nineteenth century* To counter opposition and relieve 
the resulting Fears* church and state united their spiritual 
and secular worlds to withstand the "rationalistic and revo­
lutionary currents" which threatened them both*®®
As Mao Tse Tung wrote a century later regarding hi© 
own movement I "It is to th© advantage of despots to keep 
people ignorantj it is to our advantage to make them intel­
ligent. We must lead all of them gradually away from 
i g n o r a n c e . " 2 3  The power holder has little respect for man­
kind. He will educate them-—shape them--to know th© truth e© 
he sees it. For if th© majority views the world as does the 
power holder* they will agree with the oligarch as to th© 
legitimacy of his rule. The populace will then join with 
the holder to defeat hie opposition and heir him consolidate 
hie grasp upon power.
For the dominant power holder* the ideology he often 
promotes is the cult of p e r s o n a l i t y H e  will promote him­
self a© the nation*© savior and the embodiment of all wisdom*
^Popovio* The New Class in Crisis* p. 13. Also see 
Wriggins, The Ruler1"© Imperative, pp. 123-144.
22Mosca, The Ruling Claes, p. 92.
S3Mao Tse Tung, Mao Papers, ©d. by Jerome Ch*en 
CLondons Oxford University Pres©, 1970}* p. 103.
^ S e e  Wriggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, pp. 91-107.
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goodness, and power* The dominant: power holder attempts to 
encourage the impression of his indispensibility. IF he 
should perish, the dominant power holder says, so, too, will 
the country. The populace must rally to him to ©eve the state 
and themselves* Charles dm Gaulle was one who used the 
cult of personality as an effective tactic to remain in power* 
0© Gaulle, when placing a referendum before the public, 
would ask the French to vote as he desired. Should they 
fail to do so, he said he would tender hi© resignation. Un­
willing for a long time to be without his figure of stability, 
th© French followed De Gaulle’s wishes until 1969 when a 
referendum was finally defeated by French voters.
Occasionally, to strengthen his position, a pos­
sessor of power will give the impression of resigning from 
his office* The dramatic act will shock the people into 
th© realisation of his purported indispensibility. They will 
beg the power holder to remain in office, and the holder 
will "reluctantly” accede to the "will of the people.”
s^Se© his speeches of May 24 and July 20, 1968, in 
Keeslng*a Contemporary Archives, July 20, 1968, pp* 22815- 
22816, 22817-22818. Albania’s Enver Hoxha has also tried 
to portray himself as indispensible. Herbert Schmitt,
”Albania Clings to Backwardness,” Washington Post, Febr. 28* 
1971, p. A25. Leaders in the Kremlin are attempting to 
reinstate Stalin as a great man so that some of his former 
cult will rub off on them. ”Th© Middle Wey,Tt Newsweek,
January 5, 1970, pp. 22-23.
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Following -the disastrous war with Israel in 1967, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser of Egypt Followed the described course of action and 
successfully retained his position until his death.
As with other strategies designed to keep the power 
holder in his position, the cult of personality also has its 
limitations* The use of it by the power holder is effective 
only if It corresponds to the situation.^ T ime and condi­
tion© are fluid, always changing. Should the situation 
drastically alter, the power holder will find the need to 
rely upon new techniques to remain in office, He realizes 
the failure to do so means his fall.
Often, of course, there is an absence of a dominant 
power holder. Even when a dominant personage is present, 
there are others who, failing to achieve dominance for them­
selves, cannot become reconciled to any type of second-class 
statu© within the oligarchy. As a result, there is a decen­
tralization of power within the state. The rejected 
individuals will return to their own regional bases of 
support. "Being unable to rule the whole country, Cthey3 pre­
fer to rule at home, considering it better to reign in hell
27than serve in heaven."
86□avid 0, Searing, "Models and Image© of Man and Society 
in Leadership Theory,” Journal of Politic©, XXI CFebruary,
1969), 13-15. ' :
27Michels, Political Parties, p. 198• This has occurred 
in Belgium, Henry Glnlger, "Belgian Coalition, Off to a Shaky 
Start Must Bring Together a Jigsaw Nation," New York Times,
Febr. 2, 1972, p. 18, and in Iraq, William Tuohy, ”Iraq*s New
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Should the oligarchs come under extreme attack From 
their constituents, they may seem “bo bend with the pressure 
and appear to relinquish some of their power. "But their 
submission is Feigned; they are well aware that if they 
simply remain glued to their posts, their quality as execu­
tants oF the will of the masses will before long lead to a
restoration of their Former dominance."22 «
After examining th© restraining influences of the 
Fear For position, the questions should toe asked: Why did
the Fear Fail to prevent Adolf Hitler From launching his 
armies ©cross the boundaries of Poland and leading his nation 
into war? Why was Hitler willing to risk Germany*s existence 
and thus his own position a© head of one oF the world*s 
great powers?
As with many others, the German leader was unwilling 
to "reign in hell" when he could dream of capturing heaven. 
Hitler*© self was only partially actualized after he suc­
ceeded to Germany*© leadership. He was not whole and thereby
i
not at the point of Feeling the need to conserve. Hitler 
remained a seeker at the same time he held dominant power 
For Germany. For his self to toe made whole, Hitler had to 
have the German eagle grasp the globe in its claws.29 He had
Mood of Toleration Laid to Fiscal Troubles," Washington Post, 
Oec. 7, 1970, p. A18*
22Miohel©, Political Parties, p. 173.
2%pe©r, Inside, pp. 281-323.
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to have Germany in the undisputed position of dominant power 
for the entire world. Hitler wae afraid his destiny would 
never be realized by any other method, so he reacted by 
plunging into war.
The power holder is confronted with no greater threat 
than one made against hi© position. Hi© life*© ambition was 
to achieve status as a ruler. To be forced no longer to 
look up, but to be able instead to look down at the world, 
ia the basic need in his life. Yet, it is not hi© life’s 
desire alon;©* If he is successful, there are always those 
waiting and attempting to supplant him.®® In realizing his 
survival is threatened, the power holder, just as hi© 
ancestors before him, fears. He reacts with every instrument 
at his command to destroy those who would destroy him. As 
his fellow oligarch© are strong enough to topple him, they 
must be rewarded. As the people can be rallied to attack 
him, the power holder in turn attempts to rally them to pro­
tect him. Public policy ha© been th© result more often of
®®At times the ruler will attempt to either avoid a 
confrontation with the seeker or, at least, put the seeker at 
a disadvantage when the confrontation occurs. Zanzibar’s 
Sheikh Absid Araani Karume attempted the former method when he 
decreed there will be no election© for sixty years. Jim 
Hoagland, "Zanzibar’s Revolution Becomes One-Man Rule," 
Washington Post, March IS, 197S, p. A16. Former Prime Minister 
Harold Wilson unsuccessfully attempted the latter course when 
he called for British elections months before he was legally 
bound to do when he saw poll© showing a great increase in 
popular support for his party. "Polls Show Sain for Labor 
Party,” New York Times, April 24, 1970, p. 9.
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the power holder*© reaction to -the Fear Far losing* or 
never completely achieving, position than ©F any other single 
cause.
CHAPTER V
OTHER FEARS
Public policy is often the result of a power holder*s 
reaction to a threat lodged against his position. However, 
there are those powerful individuals whose positions are 
relatively secure and fear for position is rarely found 
materializing within them. Also, power holders do not de­
vote their entire concentration to worrying about the 
tenuousness of their status. Considerations other than 
those dealing with the ruler's position often are at th© 
root of many decisions. On occasion, these other con­
sideration© are inextricably bound to the fear for position. 
Often times they have an impact of their own. As with the 
fear© for life and position, the other considerations deal 
with desire© needing to be realized to make the ruler truly 
whole. When the desires are threatened, be it before or 
after realization, the power holder reacts and public 
policies are conceived. Some of the desire© are acceptance, 
esteem, legacy, creation, power, charisma, and ideology.
Upon acquiring power, and with each ascending step 
into the upper reaches of the oligarchy, the power* holder 
finds himself placed in a new environment. The world he 
enter© was only just before populated by oligarchs who looked 
down on him, and he up at them. To become comfortably
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situated in hi© new position, he desire© the acceptance
of hi© new peer group• Until he Feels truly accepted, he
i© ill at ease and hi© self 1© not realized. IF hi© ascension
is rapid, th© new power holder realize© many mannerisms
reFlecting hi© previous inFerior statu© will be all too
apparent: to both him and those whose approval he desires.
Fear oF not being accepted may cause the oligarch to make
decision© reFlecting what he Feels is expected of him or
what his new peers tell him he should do.
When Lyndon 0. Johnson was thrust into the Presidency,
he was Forced to ©ubmit to a time oF adjustment. The staff
around him was dedicated to another Fallen individual. While
Johnson oFten had been at odd© with them, it would be diffi-
cult to believe he did not want the acceptance of those who
had Formed John Kennedy*© circle of adviser©.^
Almost a usurper in his own mansion, sensitive to 
the Fact that in his every move he was being compared 
to Kennedy, he had, nevertheless, to carry on govern­
ment in hi© own manner. This was the period when his 
harsh, almost brutal treatment oF his own people 
reached a peak. . . •
Yet, there he was, performing beyond any normal 
human capacityf performing flawlessly as President, 
though less well a© a human being; suspicious of those 
around him, yet at the same time trying to Forgive; 
unable to translate himself to the idiom by which 
Kennedy had made the nation listen; conscious of hie 
own style and resentful when comment was mad© on it 
by the press • • • •
Many of Johnson*© initial act© were designed to show
^Theodors H. White, The Making of the President**-1964 
iNew Yorks Th© New American Library, Inc., 19663, p* 76.
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continuity both with what Kennedy had desired and with what 
Kennedy*s staff told Johnson he had desired* But, fear for 
acceptance is something a strong individual cannot live with 
forever. He reaches the point where fear of losing one*© 
individual self forces him to insist his entourage conform to 
his desire© rather than he to theirs. Johnson reflected such 
a moment in a meeting with government officials concerning 
a prearranged presentation of awards to distinguished 
Americans* Kennedy had decided to perform the ceremony over 
the space of forty-five minute© and the official© assumed 
Johnson would follow Kennedy’s plans. "At which Johnson burst 
out that he was tired of people telling him he had to do 
this or that oh another thing because it hed been the most 
important thing in the world to John F. Kennedy-*-it would take 
him fifteen years to do it all* He wouldn’t give the cere­
mony more than ten minute© for television • • .
Johnson’s position we© secure, but his acceptance 
was not. He had to prove to himself and other© his indivi­
dual ability to be made a member of the oligarchy’s highest 
reaches. Until he was elected President on his own, he 
could never be certain of his acceptance as the chosen leader 
among his new peer group•®
^Ibid., p. 75*
Haiti’s leader, Jean-Claude Ouvalier, has similarly 
sought acceptance for his country within the world’s community. 
Peter Sraestrup, "Papa Doc’s Legacy," Washington Post, May 2, 
1971, p. 61.
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Han wants to- be looked upon Fondly and deemed by 
other© to be important. The oligarch also desires to b© 
honored and the Fear For esteem arise© when the Feeling is 
present of honor no longer being bestowed* The oligarch will 
often undertake action© he hope© will please his countrymen 
and thus receive their continued respect and best wishes. 
Abraham Lincoln on numerous occasion© bowed to entreaties 
and pardoned condemned deserters.^ He had © deep "craving 
For the approval of a wide public* When the new© of Chancel** 
lorsville burst upon him, his reaction was notionly ’Our cause 
i© lost! * but the guest Ion, ’What will the people ©ay?’,,s
Lincoln needed esteem, without it he was no longer whole. Hi©
unwillingness to plan For a harsh reconstruction upon the
South is at least a partial reflection of his need For esteem*
At times, however, esteem is withheld. The leader’© * 
eyes then turn, if they had not don© so previously, to to** 
morrowj and the fear For legacy now become© a dominant 
consideration For the leader can say it will be left to his­
tory to Judge his actions. ”History will prove Lyndon 
Johnson right," said Lyndon Johnson* The dominant power 
holder is in the spotlight. His self will endure forever 
in books and he wants the self that endures to be glorious.
^For example, see three of hla letters in Lincoln, 
Collected Works, pp. 9, 205.
^Harold 0. Lasswell, Politics: Who Gets What, When,
How (New York* HcGraw-Hill Book Company,- line."i iggg}, p, 187•
Not© 1© therefor® emphatically mad© of Richard Nixon being the 
first President in history to initiate many undertaking© 
such as hi© visit to China,® The leader who must rely on 
tomorrow to judge him may be less willing to shift and change 
policies than one who must receive continuous cheer® from 
the crowds# The leader in the latter category, since every 
act i© a possible issue around which the power seeker can 
gather support, will be apt to quickly drop or revise 
policies which are found to cause unfavorable response within 
the citizenry. The power holder who fears for legacy to a 
greater extent than he doe© esteem can wait and allow 
history to- provide his cheer©.
for the dominant power holder who has no reason to 
fear for life, position, acceptance, esteem, or legacy, another 
fear will often motivate many of hi© actions— the fear for 
creation, Most often found within the power holder who 
brought his nation through great ordeal© and dedicated hi© 
life to its construction, the fear for creation will direct 
the leader to make policies assuring the product of his 
work will continue to survive when he no longer is on the 
scene. The nation i© hi© creation and legacy,so long a© it
®Sae Carroll Kilpatrick, "President Stresses Peace a©
Hi© Aim," Washington Post, Febr. 18, '1978, p. Al. The fear 
for legacy was evident in Nixon’s decision to ©end troops 
into Cambodia* He ©aid, "Whether X may be a one-term Presi­
dent is insignificant compared to whether by our Failure to 
act in this crisis the United States proves itself to be un­
worthy to lead the Force® of freedom in this critical period 
in world history." "Transcript of President’s Address to the 
Nation on Military Action in Cambodia," New York Times, May 
1, 1970, p. 2.
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lives mm He conceived it;, the power* holder lives*
Tito of Yugoslavia is, in essence, Assured of toeing the
dominant; leader of his nation For the rest of his life.- Me
has no reason to Fear For his position. The Yugoslav©
recognize him e© the Father oF their country, and he has 
no need to Fear For esteem*- However, he does Fear For 
his creation. Yugoslavia ha© oFten been in turmoil as the 
result oF the rivalry of the many nationalities comprising 
the country, Tito*© dominance of hi© nation ha© been oF a 
quality to hold the diverse peoples together. Yet, with 
advancing age, Tito realize© his presence soon' will toe gone 
and, with it, his binding InFluence. To assure a united 
nation aFter he departs, Tito has seen Yugoslavia grant 
some autonomy to the various ethnic groups within its 
boundaries. He also has moved to reorganize the presidency, 
making it multiple in character and allowing representation 
within it oF leaders of tooth the various reputelie© and oF 
leading social and political organizations. As Tito said,
"It has oFten been ©aid abroad that when I disappear Yugo** 
©lavia will collapse* In our country, too, there 1© much 
©peculation about my successor. I thought that it could 
provoke m very serious crisis* . . • To spar© our socialist 
community such e crisis, which ie desired by many, we must 
carry out this reorganization CoF the presidency],n7
^Speech oF September 21, 1970 quoted in Keeping*s 
Contemporary Archives, July 31-August 7, 1971, p. 24733.
Sine© non© of Yugoslavia1© 'power seekers can hop© tso 
supplant Titoi they have looked to their home region© for ah 
area to rule and have courted their various ethnic groups, 
producing an intensification of nationalistic rivalry and a 
threat to Tito*© creation. In anger, Yugoslavia’s leader 
responded: f#People say that Tito is an empty gun , . . .
They will see this time that the gun i© not empty* We have 
plenty of ammunition * • « ' *,f® Tito fired the gun in 
December, 1971, and purged m number of separatist Croat lead­
ers. In both instances of reorganizing the presidency 
and purging the Croat hierarchy, Tito reflected a reaction 
to threat© launched against hi© creation.*^
Tito knew it was his responsibility to provide for
®Supra» p. 65•
q
Speech of May 6, 1971, quoted in Keeping* a Contem­
porary Archives, July 31-August 7, 1971, p. 24734.
l^Oan 'Morgan, #,Croation Nationalist© Threaten Unity 
of Yugoslavia,f| Washington Post, Dec. 17, 1971, p. AS1 •
Dan Morgan, MYugoslavs Continue- Crackdown Against Separatist 
Qroups,*’ Washington Post, Jan. 1, 1972, p. AS.
H t h© fear for creation also can toe seen in the 
Syrian military’s moderate position toward Israel in order 
to- keep Syria from toeing destroyed* Jess© w* Lewis, Jr., 
HAriny Takeover May Moderate Syrian Stance on M-Ideast War,” 
Washington Post, Nov. 15, 1970, p. A29• The Shah of Iran 
©Iso is attempting to strengthen hi© country before he 
leaves the scene. Jonathan C. Randal , '’The Shah1© Iran,M 
Washington Post. Oct, 10, 1971, p. C4. Spain’s Franco, too, 
has tried to assure continuance in his country of hi© work 
by picking his successor* "Juan Carlos May Take Oath a© 
Franco1s Heir Wednesday,” New York Times, July IS, 1969, 
p. 3.
the continued life of hi© creation* Adolf Hitler knew it 
was hit responsibility to complete his creation before his
13
death* Mention has been made of Hitler’s fear for hie life, 
and of the precautions he made to protect his position by 
signing a treaty with Stalin**3 Albert Speer felt Hitler’s 
belief in an imminent death motivated him to advance hi© 
deadlines for hi© planned destiny**^ His ambition was to 
"create m great empire* All the Sermanio people© will be 
included in it* It will begin in Norway and extend to 
northern Italy* I myself must carry this out. If only I 
keep my health!" The new Sermany was to be Hitler’s 
creation! he alone could achieve it and time was short.
Hitler thus turned his divisions against the Soviet Union 
before he had originally planned and opened a second front. 
Hitler feared his creation would never be achieved end he 
reacted*
The fears for power, charisma, end ideology often 
have a direct relationship to the fear for position* Usually 
the amount of power held by an individual is the determining 
factor in the position he hold© in an oligarchy. The fear 
for power, however, covers instances where position should
^®Sugra, p * 48«
*3Supra, p* 57.
14Speer, Inside* p. 156*
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more properly be termed office. The fear arise© within an 
oligarch who is secure in his office, but the power he 
exercises from the office is threatened# President Theodore 
Roosevelt wee in no greet danger as regards his officeJ yet, 
when he desired to send the American navy around the world by 
way of Japan, Congress refused to fund the venture# The 
negative response to Roosevelt*© desire threatened his 
powerf and in a reaction, the President sent the navy to 
Japan anyway and told Congress to appropriate money to bring 
them back# The fear for power activated Theodore Roosevelt 
, to respond#^®
The cult of personality has been an instrument long 
used to secure the position of power for the leader. ^  The 
power holder fears a lose of the cult— of charisma— for two 
reasons# Should the power holder lose his charisma— the 
mechanism lying between hi© position and hi© enemies— his 
position will become jeopardized# Thus, the fear for charisma 
Is linked with the fear for position# On the other hand, it 
is comforting to be honored* Recalling the importance of 
esteem for the leader, he fear© the loss of charisma a© it 
results in the lose of esteem and a part of the ©elf worth
^ The fear for power also is seen in the attempts 
of Richard Mixon to keep the reins of the military in his 
hands# MA Duel Over the Rower to Make War,** Newsweek,
May eS, 1970, pp* 29-31. '
^Supra, pp. 63-65.
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t g
conserving. Of course,
charismatic authority 1© naturally unstable. The 
holder may loee his charisma, ha may Feel *for©ak©n 
.by hie God, * * • • f its may appear. to hi© follower© that
*hi© power© have left him.* • . • Hi© follower©
abandon him, for pure charisma doe© rot recognize 
any legitimacy other then on© that flow© from personal 
strength proven time and again. . . .  He gains end 
retain© it solely by proving hi© power© in practice. 
. . .  His divine mission must prove itself by bring*
Ing well-being to hi© faithful follower©! if they do 
not fare well, he obviously is not the god-sent 
master.
To retain the qualitlea of the ”god-sent master,M 
Cshould the fear for chari©me prove stronger than the fear 
for position}, the power holder will abandon hi© office
rather then risk a lose of charisma. Following World War
II, Charles de Gaulle retained the ohariem© he had often 
shown* Since the French government became more institutional 
then personal in chareoter^From 1948-1946, Oe Gaulle left 
hi© position to retain the charisma which would eventually 
prove to bring him back to power in 195©.^
Seoause the need man feela ^or a leader fluctuate© 
according to the dlffioultiae he is encountering,30 the 
charismatic leader must continually reestablish hi© identity
Weber, economy and Society, ed. by Guenther 
Both and Glaus Wittlch tNew York* ©sdminater Press, 1988}, 
p. 1114.
^Stanley Hoffman and Inge Hoffman, ♦•The Will to 
Grandeur* de Gaulle a® a Political Artist,” in Rustow,
Philoeophers and Kings, p. ©89.
3QSupra, pp. 29-30.
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by Fulfilling hi© "divine mission” and '’bringing well-being 
150 his Followers.” Hemeeds times of upheaval to prove
■t
himself tso hi© constituency and tso himself,
Conditions oF di stir ess have been . . .  seized Cby 
De Gaulle) with characteristic glee SO 3S Ho re—enact 
his mission and Ho renew his charismai whan he puH 
on his general*© uniform before Hhe TV camera while 
Algiers was rioting in January I960 j when he ©mashed 
Hhe army rebellion in April 1951 . . . .  Moreover,
Hhe ©Hyle of his Foreign policy . . . serves Hhe 
Function of producing . . .  mini-drama© that■renew 
his appeal, ©s if he, Hoc, needed Ho create crises for 
whose solution© he will be * erect end necessary* Cfor 
example, . . . Hhe Canadian venture3*
Charisma, then, 1© more than merely a defensive 
mechanism For the power holder*© position. To be charismatic 
may be the power holder*© greatest desire. The survival of 
his charisma thus is more important than any position.
Man seeks power to serve his own interests. He use© 
Ideology*— the great motivator of followers--©© a tool For the 
preservation or acquisition of power True ideology, how­
ever, must be served by the individual* But to be a slave 
to an ideal' is difficult.^3
For the great majority of men, idealism alone is an 
inadequate incentive for the fulfillment of duty. 
Enthusiasm is not an article which can be kept long
2lj-foffman, ’’Will to Grandeur," p. 289.
PP • 82-63.
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■^Michels, PolItleal Parties, p. 145. Former 'Norwegian 
leader, Per Bar-ten, took actions counter to his isolationist 
ideology when he sponsored Norway*© move into the European 
Economic Community. Still, it should be noted he later re­
linquished his position rather than, continue the action. "EEC 
Issue Topple© Norway*© Cabinet," Washington Post, Mar. 3, 1971, 
p . A15 *
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in store. Men who will stake their bodies and 
their lives For e moment, or even For some month© in 
succession, on behalf oF a great idea often prove 
incapable of permanent work in the service of the 
same idea even when the sacrifices demanded are com­
paratively trifling# The joy of self-sacrifice is 
comparable to a fine gold coin which can be ©pent 
grandly all at once, whereas if we change it into 
small coin it dribbles imperceptibly away#
To acquire power takes self-confidence and a reliance
on self# To be successful likewise takas pragmatism# Woodrow 
Wilson, a man who could be said to be idealistic in hie hopes 
for the post-world War I world* stated: "Politios must fol­
low the actual winding© of the channel ofi the rivert if it 
steer by the ©tars it will run aground.”®^ However, as W. 
Howard Wriggins aptly notes, "without ideologies defining 
purposes, projecting a higher vision of the weaning and end 
of it all, political life may coma to appear— as it may in­
deed become— simply a gem© of jockeying for position, a 
©I** S3 £5© and cynical struggle for the spoils#"^
Man varies and to ©ay there has never been idealistic
motivation in the oligarchy must be regarded ©a, at best, 
questionable# There have been those willing to risk their 
position of leadership in order to aid in their ideology*s 
survival# An example can be found in the early Christian 
leaders who allowed themselves to be sacrificed rather than
^Woodrow yilaon. Leaders of Men, sd by T*H, Vail 
Hotter [Princeton, New Jersey! Princeton University Press, 
19SS3, p# 48#
SB^riggins, The Ruler*s Imperative, p# 144#
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deny their faith* Perhaps Wilson forgot his adage when he 
spoke out so vehemently in favor of a League of Nations*
Still the fear for ideology ae a motivating force behind 
public policy has played but a minor role in the history of 
the oligarch;*
Power holders have been motivated by many different 
fears* Pears for acceptance, esteem, legacy, power, charisma, 
and ideology are factor© lying behind many public policies* 
Just as with the fears for life and position, the importance 
of the individual anxieties varies from person to person*
One power holder may be motivated primarily by on© fear* 
Another oligarch may mak© policiesreflecting a wide rang© 
of apprehensions* Whatever the reason, the Importance of 
the policies is in their ability to have great or minor 
affect upon the lives of the nation and the citizen-
CHAPTER VI 
AN EXAMPLE.! JEFFERSON QAVtS
Various fiwrt Have been portrayed as motivating 
Force© lying behind public policies of different power 
holders* To gain increased insight into the broad area
within which Fear operates* it is beneficial to examine
on© power holder closely to see how his action© were governed 
by fear. The individual to be scrutinized is Jefferson 
Davis who is recognized a© having been the dominant leader 
of the oligarchy of the American South which came to 
organize the Confederate States* Though the "rule© of 
the political game" in the Confederacy had a prohibitive 
effect upon initiation of much domestic policy by © central 
authority, important action© were undertaken by it© Fresi** 
dent COavie} primarily as a result of fear* In hi© willing**
ness to submit to his fear© by forming policies in the
restrictive atmosphere of the Confederacy* Davis is an 
important figure to note. For if Davis would act in such a 
manner as to violate the "rule© of the game," how much 
easier it would be for^a leader In a less prohibitive situation 
to do likewise in the face of fear*
In the early day© following United States* independence, 
Southerners desiring power were able to find self**fulflllment
S3
in the new American oligarchy. The dominant power of their 
section of the country in the sphere of Foreign trade, as 
well a© in the economy of the rest oF the nation, dictated 
the presence oF many oF their number in the rank© oF power 
holders. Virginians-^Seorge Washington, Thornes Jefferson, 
and James M©di©an-->all played vital roles in the Revolution 
and in the governing oF the newly Founded nation as all 
three later came to reach th© pinnacle of power as President. 
Besides being well represented In the Executive Branch, the 
South at this time also held positions oF great strength in 
the Congress and Judiciary as is evidenced by the presence 
oF John C. Calhoun end John Marshall in the respective 
branches«
However, times changed. The Northern oligarchs were 
gaining increasing power a© merchants and manufacturer©. 
Immigration was swelling their populace,. Forcing it to 
expand into new areas. The South, on the other hand, could 
match Northern expansion For only a limited time. The 
basis of the Southern economy was cotton, but th© condition© 
upon which the crop9© vitality depended puickly reached 
their limit* Productive land was ruined and -after moves 
into Alabama, Mississippi, and Fimelly Texas, new land 
was not to be Found. As more and more people Filtered into 
the North, the South lost its strong position in the House 
of Representatives. As more states came into the Union, the 
South, being land restricted, could only wage a delaying
84
action against th© growing number© of Northerners in the 
oligarchy with the Missouri Compromise of 1880* Eventually, 
the South lost control of the Senate*
Lack of land was not the only problem the cotton
economy faced* Th© Southerners felt th© need for slavery,
which had given the South economic wealth and thereby power*
The North1s economy had no ©uch need for slavery and it 
began to agitate for the destruction of this form of 
servitude. While the South held great power in the Congress 
and the Presidency, it was safe from the Northern threat to
slavery and thus its position* Yet, the North was expanding,
squeezing Southerner© out of the national oligarchyj and in 
an effort to meet th© growing threat, th© Southern power 
holders took steps to insure the maintenance of their way 
of life*
To gain support from their fellow Southerner© and to 
put an obstacle in the path of Northern dominance, the 
oligarchs developed an ideology to justify ©nd protect 
their position** Best expounded by John G* Calhoun, the 
rising * belief structure wee based on America*© sacrosanct Con­
stitution and Oeeiaration of Independence* Th© ideology’s 
chief articles of faith were tot.be found in terminology 
devised to protect states* Cspelled S-O-U-T-H-E-P-N} rights*
1 Supra, pp • *...62-63
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In essence, th© Constitution end resulting government; were
£.i
said to have been constructed toy th© individual states joining 
together and forming a compact* Should th© majority of th© 
state© succeed in passing a law harmful to an individual 
state, that state could declare the law null within Its 
boundaries* Should this tactic fall, the state could re­
gard the compact as broken and separate from th© nation it 
had previously joined. After all, the South would ©ay, is 
the method not the seme a© was used by the revered Founding 
Father© when they broke with the Crown? To the South, then, 
the ^Compact Theory” was based on the most solid of ideologi­
cal foundation©.:
Regarding th© issue of slavery. Southerners found 
justification for their ^peculiar institution” by claiming to 
feed, clothe, and shelter their sieves while th© Northern 
factory worker© received starvation wages. Further, the slave 
owners provided the blacks with knowledge of Christianity 
which they otherwise would not have gained. The Southerner© 
claimed to be living the ideal© of democracy end freedom. 
Northern agitators were viewed as trouble makers who did not 
understand the true Southern life style nor the factual 
meaning of the Constitution.
The North*a power had grown and the South, with or 
without Ideology, could no longer dictate its will. On the 
other hand, the North was not strong enough to force its own 
will upon the South. A middle ground was agreed upon to 
protect the Southern interest© and the Compromise of 1850 was
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©FFeoted, In retrospect, th© tactic© of compromise ware 
merely delaying in nature, For the North wa© destined to gain 
control of th© American oligarchy. A© time pas©edf even 
though Congress was in the increasing grasp of th© North, the 
South Felt Its position to be secure as long as a man with 
a viewpoint not anti-Southern in nature was President.
With the election oF antislavery proponent Abraham Lincoln 
to the oFFice oF ChieF Executive, however, the threat to the 
Southern oligarchy reached its apex. The ability oF the 
South to have a, dominant voice in th© eFFairs of the nation 
was gone. The oligarchy recognized the loss and also believed 
their position as dominant power holder© within the South 
itself could be put in Jeopardy by Lincoln.® They Felt a 
threat, and th© resulting Fear caused them to react by 
leaving the Union, For the Southern oligarchs, it was pre- 
Ferable to f,reign in hell than serve in heaven.”®
Within lB61*s atmosphere oF secession, delegate© 
representing the oligarch© oF th© various states met in 
Montgomery, Alabama, to construct a new government,
JeFFerson Davis, appointed by the gathering oF power holder© 
to head the oligarchy as President oF th© ConFederacy, would 
take actions in the next Four years having Far-reaching
®See Rcmbort w« Patrick, JeFFergon Davie and Hi© Cabinet 
CBaton Rougej Louisiana State University Press, 1944j, pp. 
l-SB and.Carleton Seal©, War within a War CPhiladelphiai 
Chilton Books, 19SS3 *
3Sugra, P* 65,
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consequences For the South* To understand those action©, m 
glimpse of Davis, the man, is necessary. Then the fears 
operating or not operating upon him can be axmniftad-and 
explained*
Jefferson Davis was born in 1808 to a family far 
from aristocratic in background. Still, the desire to 
achieve high status was- evident in Davis* father. For the 
elder Oavis, statu© could only be achieved with education.
In his last letter to hi® ©on he wrote t "Remember the short 
lessons of instruction offered you before our parting. Use 
©very possible means to acquire useful knowledge as knowledge 
is power * . . The youth did not initially enjoy the
struggle to learn and.related how his father told him,®
*0f course, it is for you to elect whether you 
will work with heed or handsf my son could not be ©n 
Idler. I want more cotton-pickers and will give you 
work.*
The next day, furnished with a bag, I went into 
th© fields and worked ell day and the day after. The 
heat of the sun and th© physical labor, in conjunction 
with the implied equality with the other cotton- 
pickers, convinced me that school was the lesser evil.
It was Jefferson*® older brother Joseph, however, who
was to exert the greatest influence upon Oavis. Joseph was
regarded a© th© richest man in Mississippi and was able to-
procure an appointment to West Point for his young brother.
Upon graduating, Davis served a short and fairly impressionable
4Jefferson Davis, .Private Letters, ad. by Hudson Strode 
CNew Yorks ■Harcourt, ©race"'^ '"’'SorI'd, 'Inc, , 1966} , pp. 6-7.
^Varina Oavis, Jefferson Davis, 1 CNew Yorks Belford 
Company, Publishers, 189(1} j, pp. 17-18.
term in the army. Obviously * HOavis loved routinej definite 
organization, obedience, deference to superior©, authority, 
gradation in position . . . .  Army life stimulated these
c
tendencies and really caked the man* s mind into fixed habits."
He later married and resigned From the military to 
live the life of a planter near hie ambitious brother. Short­
ly, however, his wife died* Oavis proceeded to withdraw 
himself from much of th© surrounding world by working 
all day and reading all night* With hie brother, he dis­
cussed th© newspaper© and political journal© of the day.
Oavis was successful as a planter and he came to nurture 
within himself John C • Calhoun and hi© fellow Southern 
oligarchs* view of the political world. That the ideology 
thus developed justified the Southerners* status was naturai-
i
ly not put forth e© a reason for its being the explanation of 
TRUTH. When Jefferson Oavis met the girl who would become his 
second wife, hi© manner of grasping what he believed to be 
the absolute forced her to write, "He impresses me a© a re­
markable type of man, but of uncertain temper, and has a way 
of taking for granted that everybody agree© with him when he 
expresses an opinion . . .  As she wrote year© later, "he
sincerely thought all he ©aid, and, moreover, could not under­
stand any other man coming to a different conclusion after
^Bufeton J* Hendrick, Statesman of the Lost Cause 
CNew York? The Literary Guild of America, Inc., 1939), p. 20.
V. C&vis, Jefferson Oavis, p. 191,
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8his premises were stated*" The tendency of Oavis to appear 
to be an ideologue was reflected years later when talking with 
sometimes opponent William Seward* Seward told Oavis many of 
his [Seward* s} antislavery speeches were done for political 
purpose©*"-to get support in the North. Oavis asked, **Do you 
never speak from conviction?** Seward replied, "Me-ver." The
astonished Oavis retorted, "As God is my judge, I never
q
©peak from any other motive.**
Beside© the drive© of status, knowledge and ideology, 
Oavis desired military glory. With his West Point experience© 
and planter1© influence, he eagerly seized the chance to lead
a Mississippi regiment in the Mexican War. He wrote hi©
sister* **If occasion offer© it may be that I will return 
with a reputation over which you will rejoice as my Mother 
would have done.***0 Oavis did achieve his reputation when he 
personally played a large role in defeating the Mexicans in 
battle. He cam© to consider himself a brilliant tactician*
But hen th© President offered to promote him to general,
□avis refused, saying the Constitution provided for such ap­
pointments to be done by the states, not the federal 
government.
8Ibld*, p* 199.
%/illiam Catton and Bruce Catton, Two Roads to Sumter 
[New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1963j, p. 168.
• Oavis, Private Letters, p. 40.
V. Oavis, Jefferson Oavis, p. 360*
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After the war, th© hero, because of the high status in 
the oligarchy of both hi© brother and himself, won appoint­
ment as Senator with th© same ease which, beFore th© war, h© 
had been elected a Representative with little opposition*
In the Senate he served well and his reputation and his power 
increased* Under Franklin Fierce he was an able Secretary oF 
War, reenforcing his belleF© in hie own military genius.^
Later Oavis returned to the Senate where he oFten championed 
the Southern ideology and ©trove to protect both th© oligarchy
as it was then constituted and the oligarchy* s Foundation oF 
ISslavery#
JeFFerson Oavis was th© man chosen to head the new 
Confederate government* Encouraged to seek status and position, 
he accepted an ideology to explain the world in term© justi­
fying end protecting his existence* Arrogant as to his
superiority as a man and a militarist, he we© chosen to use
1Ahis talent© to preserve power For the Southern oligarchy.A
Preservation oF position For the oligarchy and For 
himselF were to be the guides by which JeFFerson Oevi© led 
hi© nation* Being recognized as e military expert and a© a 
member of the higher reaches oF the oligarchy, Oavis
A JeFFerson Oavis, The Rise and Fall oF the Confederate 
Government, I CNew Yorks 0. Appleton and Company, 1881}, pp. 
23-24.
13
For instance, see the resolution© he presented to 
the Senate, February 2, 1860, in J* Oavis, Rise and Fall, I, 
pp. 42-43*
14Mary Boykin Chestnut, A Diary From Dixie CBoston{ 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 19493, p. S.
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never felts the fear for personal acceptance.*® There was 
no new peer group within the emerging government he had to 
please* Never having had to struggle and campaign to be 
elected to any of the positions he held in his life* Oavis
was not apprehensive for popular support* Since Oavis
\
refused to lower himself to do manual labor, he looked down 
upon those who made a living with their hands, and Davis thus 
did not fear for their esteem.*6 Believing knowledge to 
be the key to power, he dismissed as ignorant both those 
he held to be below hie status and those who lodged threats 
against him* "The public * * * have no correct measure 
for military operations* and the journals ere very reckless 
In their statement©."*7 "Success is the test of merit, and 
yet there has been nothing which I have found to require a 
greater effort of patience than to bear the criticism© of 
th© ignorant, who pronounce everything a failure which does 
not equal their expectation© or desires, and can see no good 
result which is not in the line of their own imagining©,"*®
The new President indicated much of the path he would 
follow in the coming years in his inaugural address as head
*®Sugra, pp. S9**71.
*sSupra, p. 72.
*7J> Oavis, Pise and Fall, IX* p. 41.
*®J. Oavis, Private betters, p. 132*
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of the provisional government. Knowing there were threats 
to the Southern oligarchy, Oavis looked to the area where 
he felt securest© the knowledge he had ecoumuiat©d--and 
turned it against the threat©. First h© used ideology to
gain support For the oligarchs* position by rallying th©
masses behind the ConFederacy• flQur political position 
• • • illustrates the American idea that governments rest
on th© consent of th© governed* and that it is the right
of the people to alter or abolish them at will whenever they 
become destructive oF the ends For which they were established 
"The Constitution framed by our Father© is that of these 
Confederate States. In their exposition of it, and in the
Judicial construction it has received, we have a light which
/
.reveals its true meaning.”®*
To retain hi® new Found dominance, Oavis couched his 
desire For power in terms of the people. ”IF I mistake not 
th© judgment of the people, a reunion with th© State© From 
which we have separated is neither practicable nor desir­
able.
Supra, pp. 62-63.
James P. Richardson, ©d.# The Messages and Papers of 
JeFFerson 'Oavis and the ConFederacy, I TF3©“ YorteT™Chelsea House 
— Robert Hector Publi©her©, 19663, p • 32.
®*Ibid.t p « 36#
S®Ibid., p. 35.
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To meet the threat; From the North and protect the 
oligarchfB position, Oavis turned to his military background 
and ignored much of hie states’ right© doctrine by centrali- 
zing the armed force©* ”For purpose© of defense, the Con­
federate State© may, under ordinary circumstances, rely 
mainly upon the militisf but it i© advisable, in the present 
condition of affairs, that there should be a well-instructed 
and disciplined army. . . .  1 also suggest that • • • a 
navy * ,* . will be rac|uir©d*,,®^
A year later. In his inaugural address as President 
of the Confederacy, Oavis applied the tactic of maligning 
those who desired to topple the Southern oligarchy
Fellow-citizens, after the struggle of ages had 
consecrated the right of the Englishman to Constitution­
al representative government, our colonial ancestors 
were forced to vindicate that birthright by an appeal 
to arms* Success crowned their efforts, and they 
provided for their posterity a peaceful remedy against 
future aggression.
The tyranny of an unbridled majority, the most 
odious and least responsible form of despotism, has 
denied us both the right and the remedy*
Nhen Oavis made his cabinet selections, he reflected
the need to gain support for his position* There were
individuals who also had desired to head the oligarchy and
Oavis had to soothe their injured pride* Oavis had to satisfy
the wants of ©till others who could possibly become opponent©
S3Ibid., p. 34.
•^Richardson, Messages and Papers, p. 188. See slso,
supra, pp* 65-SB* ——  ■
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to keep them from turning against him* He, therefore, picked 
each member of his cabinet by giving representation to the 
different geographical regions of the South* He decided no 
two cabinet posts were to be manned by individuals from th© 
same state and aliowed the individual states delegations 
meeting in Montgomery to select one of their members to 
represent their ©tat©*25
As the Confederacy was constituted on principles cf 
decentralization, Davis had few demand® to perform domestic 
services. He called for a national army to meet the biggest 
problem he had to face— the threat posed by the Northern 
armies* Ha saw the threat and was fearful. A© Mrs*
pc
Chestnut recorded, one evening
the President walked with me slowly up and down that 
long room, and our conversation was of the saddest* 
Nobody knows so well as he doe© the difficulties 
which beset this hard-driven Confederacy* As he 
talks of things a© they are now, in a melancholy 
cadence * * * •'
To relieve hi© r.ixiety, Oavis looked to Europe for 
aid. He felt the implied threat of withholding cotton— King 
Cotton— a© a result of the impending hostilities from 
Europe*s textile industry, would force the continent to 
rally to the side of the South. For years before th© war, 
the theory persisted In the South of Europe*© inability to
25 V* Davis, JefPerson Davis, II, p • 37. See also,
Supra, pp. S9*»60. —  — — *
25chestnut, Qlary, p. 352.
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survive without American cotton,®^ Davis9 own acceptance 
o f  th© belief was reflected in ©n 18SX message to the
g g
Confederate Congress, The theory of King Cotton was so 
accepted by the man that he initially viewed European support 
a© a foregone conclusion# While Oavis found comfort from 
fear© of the North in the belief of impending European 
©id, h© did recognise other threat© already on the rise 
within th© oligarchy itself. Among the oligarch© were a 
group of'radicals who could easily ©pply pressure on Oavis 
and thus be a threat to his position# Oavis ©elected one of 
the most vociferous of their number, William Lowndes Yancey, 
to represent the Confederacy in Europe, Yancey was a fiery 
leader-and Davis, being fearful of Yancey9© presence in 
hi© midst,: as well as being certain of forthcoming European 
recognition and support* felt safe in sending the man who 
desired to reopen the slave trade to represent. the South 
on th© continent where such thoughts were received with 
anathema* Oavis9 act can only be interpreted as being done 
under the belief that Yancey would not be able to influence 
the course of events# Mora importantly, the appointment 
removed from the Confederacy and Davis9 mind a possible threat 
to his personal position*
*^Frank Lawrence Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy {Chicago* 
The University of Chicago free©,. 1931), pp. 1-24#
^Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp. 148-143.
^Owsley, King Cotton, pp. 58-53#
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As time passed and European inter vents ion failed to 
materialize! Davis began to grow increasingly worried* Know* 
ing European aid was necessary to preserve the Southern 
oligarchy, he began to apply some pressure on the continent* 
While being cognizant of the Fact that too much pressure 
might force Europe to turn instead to the federal government, 
Oavi© urged Congress to debate the necessity of a cotton 
embargo to strike fear rather than animosity into Europe and 
obtain support without actually instituting an embargo*®®
The President, not necessarily fearing for personal acceptance, 
did fear the Confederacy itself would not be recognized as 
an equal in the Family of nations*
The fear of not gaining favorable European interven*' 
tion caused Davis, also, to forbid any invasions of the 
North during the war's first year. He desired the Confederacy 
to appear to the world as the attacked rather than the 
attacker* H.J* Eckenrod© feel© the policy may have had the 
actual result of costing the South the war*
Qavi© truly ©aw the need for European aid* A© the 
Confederacy fell appart, Davis became increasingly 
vitrolie and attacked the European powers* failure to
30Ibid*, pp. 31*32 and Wilfred S. Yearns, The Con* 
federate Congress £Athens, Georgia: The University of
Georgia 'fress, 19503, p* 155.
^H. J . Eckenrod©, deffereon Day let Free 1 dent of the 
South [New York: The Macmillan Company, 19303, ppT~l54~T5i»
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respond**^ The bitterness lingered after the war when he 
wrote of Britain, **how detrimental to us, and advantageous 
to our enemy, was the manner in which the leading European 
power observed its hollow profession of neutrality toward 
the beliig©r©nte.H 3 3
War was present; Davis recognized it and was afraid*
He turned to the familiar for help* Being a former army man, 
he did not interfere with the operations of the navy* Having 
previously held the office, he did operate, in effect, a© 
hi® own Secretary of War. Rather than centralizing ell of 
the troops to meet firmly/ any advance, Oavi© divided them 
throughout the Confederacy* Besides preventing any one 
general from procuring enough power to b© a threat to him, ^ 
it also was in the best interest of his personal position 
to decentralize the troops ■ for another reason* Since the 
war was supposedly being fought by the Southerner® to defend 
themselves from aggression, local politician© pressed for 
troops to protect their individual states; end Devis 
acceded to their request in order to retain their support*3 3
go
Richardson, Message® and Papers, pp• 444-44S, 48S-487.
3 3J* Davis, Rise and Pall, II, p* 382.
3 4 Eckenrode, President, p. 163*
3 3H©rdriek, Statesmen, pp. 347-349 and'Frank E •
Vandiver, Rebel Brass [Baton Rouges Louisiana State University 
Press, 1956}, p. 16*
mStill, Davie was basically able to direct all opera* 
tion© against the North# Before the first battle of Bull 
Run, it was Oavi© who chose to consolidate the armies of 
F.G.T. Beauregard and Joseph £* Johnston to meet the advanc­
ing- union forces. A® Davis said, ”Th© great question of 
uniting the two armies had been decided at Richmond.”3® 
Following the battle, Davis pressed his generals to pursue 
the fleeing enemy.3 7 In this end other instances, Oavi© 
directed what little grand strategy the South chose’ to 
exercise. He selected and removed generals, shifted force©, 
and approved plans# He tried to direct the war effort a® 
much as possible* As happen© in all wars, meet moves are made 
to counter the threats of the enemy. The fear for defeat 
of his position, pressed long and hard upon Davis; so much 
so, h© confided to his wife,. ”h© felt he would give all 
his limb® to have someone with whom he could share it.”®® 
However, he never did choose to truly ©hare it, for his 
position meant too much to him#
Devi®, indeed, wa© not above recognising proven 
ability in others end he also realized the magnitude of 
the struggle would force him to allow other© some latitude 
to make move© on their own# Robert E . Lee’s military
Davis, Rise end Fall, 1, p. 347*
3 7 Ibid., pp. 353*336#
3 3 V. Oavis, Jefferson Davis, XI, p. 301*
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genius was hailed throughout: the Soutsh and Oavis certainly 
recognised it* Lee was the standard by which all other 
commander© were measured# Though Davis ©aw Lee*© abilities 
a© great#, the President did not rank them above hi© own. 
Oavis# in hi© own mind# was commander-in-chief because 
no one in the South knew more ©bout military matter© than h© 
did. His belief in his own supremacy never faltered and 
though stating-*-nIf I could take one wing and Lee the other#
I think we could between u© wrest e victory From those 
people#” — he never chose to step down From his high oFFice 
to lead the troops in battle#
Jefferson Oavi© was accepted a© President by almost 
everyone in the South. However# in directing the war 
effort, Oavis did not always meet the approval of hi© 
generals# His most difficult moment© war© with Joseph 
Johnston* Humors claimed that Johnston and Oavis, when both 
were at Hast Point together, had a rivalry over an inn 
keeper*© daughter. During this episode# Johnston supposedly 
proved himself superior* If the rumor is true, it explain© 
many of □avis* actions as regards Johnston* in term© of a 
reaction to fear, Johnston would never accept him as an 
equal *
3 9 Ibid., p* 392.
^Hendrick, Statesmen* p# 13.
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Certainly, though, the various altercations between 
the two can be viewed as the result of the fear For position# 
Following Bull Bun, rwroors were prevalent of Oavis preventing 
pursuit of the routed enemy when in actuality he had urged 
the Confederate commanders to press their advantage#' Inter­
preting the rumors a© threats to his position, Davis wrote 
Johnston asking him to make open knowledge of what had 
actually occurred# Johnston*© response, while laying the 
blame of failure to proceed upon the presence of fresh Union 
troops, failed to make any mention of the fact Davis had urged 
pursuit# Johnston*© letter we© not looked upon as satisfactory 
by Oavis, and it was instead viewed a© a threat to the ' • 
President*© position#4*
Whan the President presented s list of name© to the 
Congress for appointment as full general, Johnston, while 
on the list, did not head it, in a possible reaction against 
the general*© threatening posture. Johnston was indignant 
and wrote of his distress to Davis who replied concerning 
the letter, ”Its language is, as you say, unusualf it© argu­
ments and statement© utterly one-sided, and its insinuations- 
a© unfounded a© they are unbecoming.” ^ Johnston*© letter 
may Hava been the result of his own reaction to what he
4 *J# Davis, Rise and Fall, I, pp. 362-384.
v
Davis, Jefferson Davis, II, pp. 144-163. See also 
Chestnut, Diary, p. -zrrn- - - - —  .
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felt was a threat to his own position, Oavis* answer 
certainly was related to His fear for his high office, as 
Johnston*s letter was interpreted as an open statement of 
Oavis not acting properly In a military matter. Continually 
there were problems. Oavis disliked Johnston and it took 
great encouragement by others and the greater threat to the 
position of the Confederacy to persuade the President to 
allow Jo femeton to command future armies.
Joseph Johnston was a capable, though unaggressive,
general. As feelings mounted against Johnston*© continual
failure to fight, Oavis, to protect his own position,
replaced him with John 8 * Hood* The switch in commanders
was don© "under popular and political pressure brought by
Bov. Brown and Sen. Hill of Be., [sic.3 who claimed that
Johnston intended to surrender Atlanta without giving 
4 0
battle.11 To prove the soundness of hi© judgment and 
thereby hi© right to govern, Oavis often had supported his 
generals, but he was quick to depose the man who was often 
a threat to his position.
Threats to the Chief Executive*© status as commander** 
in-chief also emanated from Congress. In March, 1868, a bill 
was passed to provide for a general independent of the 
President to direct the Confederacy*s armies. Oavi© responded
Alexander, Military Memoirs of a Confederate 
CBloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1962J,p.
575.
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by vetoing the bill* In ©n effort; to keep Congressional
dissatisfaction to a minimum, Oavis wrote:^
As it cannot have been the intention of Congress to 
create the office of a general not bound to obey 
orders of the Chief Magistrate, and as this seem© 
to be the effect of the act, I can but anticipate 
the concurrence of the Congress in my opinion that 
it should not become law.
A© one of hisccontemporaries stated, ,fMr. Oavis manifested 
an extreme jealousy of any encroachment upon his preroga** 
tive by Congress • . . *"
The internal status quo of the oligarchy was retained 
for the next few years* However, the Confederacy was losing 
badly* The position of the entire oligarchy was in danger 
and inrresponse to the threat some of the oligarchs began 
to look for a new leader* Their eyes turned quite naturally 
toward the individual whose successes had inspired the 
South--Ptobert £• Lee• Pressure began to rise within, as 
well as upon, the Confederate Congress to make Lee dictator* 
Davis opposed the move in an effort to continue as head of 
the oligarchy* While his power was great enough to slow 
down Congressional action, the mounting cries for Lee were 
of such magnitude as to force some accedence* The Congress­
men also were worried about their own position*s support and 
the threat© to their position by the North. Some Congress­
men, too, were seekers who wanted to cripple, if not destroy,
44Richardson, Messages and Papers, pp* 215-216.
^°Charles Maurice, An Aide-de-Camp of Lee, ed* by Sir 
Frederick Maurice (Boston Little, Brown, end Company, 1927},
*
Oavis* power. The pressure© for Congress to act were too
strong for even Oavis to completely stem as he attempted to
hold on to his position* Still, Oavis had enough power to
somewhat- turn the tide of discontent within Congress. The
two branches of government both acting from fear for position,
reached © compromisel and Lee was made supreme commander ©f
the Confederate armies^ rather than dictator. The compromise
allowed Oavi© to remain as President, although ”the passage
in both houses of the measure for making General Lee general**
in—chief by large majorities is very distasteful to the
President*”^  Most would think Davis relinquished* some- df
his prerogative© in order to retain the rest of his position*
However, Wilfred B. Yearns point© out, ’’Davis had no -qualm* ,
40about being able to handle Lee.” four years of war 
had shown Oavis that Las would refer to him before any move© 
were made* Unlike Johnston, Lee would accede to, and ba 
respectful of, the President. In actuality, according to 
Yearn©, though appearing to relinquish power, Oavi© still
^James Longstreet, from Manassas to Appomattox 
(Bloomington* Indiana s Indiana University Pros©, 19603, 
pp * 583—584*
47Robert. Gar lick Hill Kean, Inside the Confederate. 
Government, ©d. by Edward Younger CNew Yorks Oxford University 
Press, 1957}, p. 190.
^Yearns, The Penfederate Congress, p. 227.
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retained it.49 If the author is correct* Oavis* friends 
were not completely correct in saying "he is honest, pure, 
patriotic! but no administrator— the worst judge of men in 
the world • « .
Entering the conflict with the belief the entire 
populace would rally behind the*!** the oligarchy initially 
made no provisions for farced conscription# However* it 
was the oligarchy which broke with the union for its own 
preservation and not the populace which resulted in a 
shortage of men entering the ranks. Oavis again couched hi© 
true need,in this case men to save the oligarchy*© position, 
in ideology* On March 18* 1882, he wrote
The vest preparations mad© toy the enemy for a 
combined assault at numerous points on our frontier 
and seacoast have produced the result that might 
have been expected* .They have animated the people 
with_a spirit of resistance so general, so resolute, 
and so self-sacrificing that it requires rather to 
be regulated than to be stimulated.
The men were so well stimulated Davis then ©aids nI
therefore recommend the passage of a law declaring that all
persons residing in the Confederate States, between the
ages of eighteen and thirty-five • . . shall be held in the
military service • . * *"
49Supra« p* 66.
" K e a n , Inside Government, p. 72*
■ Richardson, Messa gee and Papers, p* 206•
Men over* thirty-five with their "natural experience are 
needed for maintaining order and good government at home 
and in supervising preparations for rendering efficient 
armies in the field.” Five month® later, threat® to the 
Confederacy1© position increased! and though trying to shift 
the onus elsewhere, men over thirty-five were now seen as 
well qualified for the army, "The very large increase of 
forces recently called into the field by the President of 
the United States may render it necessary hereafter to extend 
the provisions of the conscription law so as to embrace 
person© between the age© of thirty-five and forty-five 
years,”"
The oligarch© were men of power whose support was 
needed by Davis, and exemption from the draft was provided 
for those who owned twenty or more slave©* The resulting 
public outcries forced Oavi© to call for.repealing the act 
to avoid mas© desertion.3 3
Another bill was passed by the Congress which was 
designed. In essence, to draft native© of Maryland residing 
in Richmond Into the army. But In order to avoid turning 
neutral Maryland into a threat, Oavis killed the bill with 
the use of the pocket veto*94
"ibid., p. 238,
earns, The Confederate Congress, p. 79.
5 4 Ibid.. p. 76.
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Here men were still needed to preserve the Southern 
oligarchy* The government tried unsuccessfully to prevent 
raising popular animosity toward the government by refusing 
to. conscript slaves. Finally* however, Oavis was con­
quered sufficiently by his fear for position on November ?f 
1864, to form a policy calling for the placement of slave© 
in the army,®® Oavis fought with the Senate for passage 
of the bill saying, "If the Confederacy falls, there should 
be written on its tombstone, *Qied of a theory, M*®®
Jefferson Davie reached the point where his Ideology 
would be better dead if it assured the life of hie position.
The ©elf of Davis was only whole when he held the position 
of. power.. His ideology was adopted to fit his positlonj he 
did not seek position to further his ideology. Ideology, Oavis 
discovered, is a nicety to have only when one*© position is 
©©cure* For example, November 18, 1861, found Oavis in a 
rather solid position and he was willing to state ideological 
beliefs* Using designed to protect position, ideology was 
used to damn Lincoln for suspending■the. writ of habeas 
corpus "bo sacred to freemen* " ® 7 Three short months later, 
unrest in certain areas of the South forced Oavis to suspend
®®Pichardsom, Messages and Papers, pp. 493«-496.
®®<J* Oavis, flee and fall, X, p. 518*
®7Pichard©omt Hessegee and Papers, p. 138.
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ga
*the writ: Himself#
The Southern ideology of states* right:© did not coin­
cide with the need to fight a total war# Oavis, as the war 
progressed, came to attempt increased centralization of the 
war-directing apparatus. However, in various sections of the 
Confederacy could be found those who preferred to "reign in 
hell than serve in heaven,” Governors Zeb Vance of North 
Carolina and Joe Brown of Georgia in particular put obstacles 
in Oavis* path which he could never completely bypass. As 
frank E . Vandiver stated, "The South may have been wrecked 
by decentralized centralization#"®® Oavis* position could 
only be saved by centralization so he ©crapped hi© ideology* 
Vanoe and Brown*s positions were protected by their Southern 
ideology, allowing them to retain the doctrine of states* 
rights.
To the end, the President sought to keep possession 
of his position. Basil Duke was with Davis in the final 
days of the Confederacy. Duke told the President all was 
lost and Duke had a responsibility to prevent the further 
bloodshed of his men. Oavis tried to sway Ouke and his men 
and force them to change their minds. "Even," he said,
"if the troops now with me be all that I can for the present 
rely on, three thousand brave men are enough for a nucleus 
around which the whole people will rally whon the panic
5 0 Ibid., p. £19•
JJ*Q
Vandiver, Rebel Brass, p. 126*
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which now afflicts-© them ha© passed away.” Duke state©,®®
He appealed eloquently iso ©very sentiment and 
reminiscence tshats mights be supposed tso move a 
Soutshern soldier . . . . For some minutes not; a 
word was spoken* Then Mr. oavi© rose and ejaculated 
bitterly that all was indeed lost. He had become
very pallid . . . .
Duke further state© he believed 0avis desired to be captured
after realising the struggle was completed.
Oavi© was willing to give himself to his enemy*
His ©elf was only made whole when he held dominant power.
After his position was taken from him, he was no longer
truly alive. Davie held all of the qualities of e power
seeker*■ he we© confident, egocentric end self-righteous*
Once in power, his public policies ^ ©re geared to- retaining
his position. Hi© choice of cabinet members, search for
European aid, and management of the war reflect the presence
of the fear for position* Possibly ©am© of hie motivation©
in the diplomatic field were the result of the fear for
acceptance. If the Confederacy was recognised as m nation*
state by the European government©, then Oavi© would in turn
be truly recognized as the equal of any of the other heads
of government in the world* Oavi© never achieved this
acceptance. Moreover, his position of dominant power holder
in the South was destroyed# He became "pallid,” and he was,
in essence, no longer the real Jefferson Davis# He was once
6 0 8asil W. Duke, "Last Days of the Confederacy,” in 
Settles and Leaders of the Civil War, ed* by Robert Johnson 
end'Clarence Suel, IV Chew York* The Century Co*, 18873, 
pp, 762—766.
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again a parson who could turn to ideology. He defended his 
actions a© President in his apologia, The Rise and Fall of
C  1
the Confederate Government, by saying.
The Southern States had rightfully the power to with­
draw from a Union into which they had, as sovereign 
communities, voluntarily entered; that the denial of 
that right was a violation of the letter and spirit 
of the compact between the States; and that the 
war waged by the Federal Government against the 
seceding States was in disregard of the limitations 
of the Constitution, end destructive of the principles 
of the Declaration of Independence.
SI
J * Oavis, Rise and Fall, I, p. v.
SUMMARY
A© man evolved, ©a did hi© need For a leader and hi© 
ability to Fear* A leader protected and fed him, while 
fear gave him the ability to be cognizant of threats to his 
survival. Man. ha© thus allowed, or been forced, to accept 
ruler© to be situated above him. However, those ruler© 
cannot escape their own humanness* They, too, must obey 
their own inborn and experiential characteristics. They 
also fear, and out of their fear, react. Because of their 
situation, the rulers* reactions have the physical and moral 
force of the; nation-state behind them, and their reactions 
become translated into public policy.
Man*© survival has ceme to mean more than simply a 
breathing existence. He had developed certain psychological 
needs and until they are satisfied hi© mental self will not 
have been actualized. And until hie mental self is made 
whole, he doe© not have a life worth preserving. for the 
ruler to actualize hi© own self, he must be in possession of 
the mysterious intangible substance known a© power— a 
substance which allows him to reign over others.
After examining the phenomena, a greet contradiction 
seem© to appear in those who are called power holders. These 
men often spend many years desperately desiring and clawing
Ill
for the golden ring of power— for the glittering substance- 
which will insure a whole self— end fearing it will never be 
attained. Yet, once the power is actually acquired, it is 
found to be more of an addictive curse, rather than an 
end to an unquenchable thirst. The self-righteous, confident, 
egocentric power seeker find® that the acquisition of the 
golden ring is in reality obtalnment of a new and unsteady- 
ing fear. The fear he feels of losing his preferred status 
is greater than- was his fear of never being able to attain 
the position. In response, the power holder acts €o calm 
hi© anxiety. Public policies which may have great effect 
upon the common eit 1 seen are a result of the fear of losing 
power. The more intensely the fear i® felt, the more 
obvious is the evidence of anxiety being the prime motivation 
of public policy. The fear of losing power, which can be­
come ell consuming, is a basic, if not absolute, explanation 
for public policies. In essence, man does not wield power 
as much as power wields man.
After gaining the golden ring, the self-righteous, 
confident, and egocentric power seeker discovers he loses* 
to an ever-fluctuating degree, the element termed confidence. 
He does, however, retain the egoeentricity which saturates 
him with the fear for his survival. He fears for his life.
But because he cannot be whole without power, he fears for 
the elements which for him are embodied in power. He is 
anxious for his position, acceptance, esteem, legacy,
lie
creation, power, charisma, and ideology*
Fear For life is the most; basic of all anxieties• 
Though rarely reflected directly in policies, it ha© often 
had an indirect affect upon a leader’s action* The evidence 
is seen in the elaborate measures taken by Nkrumeh to guard 
his own security* The result of the Fear for life is an 
isolation from the governed and a reliance upon e few close, 
but seldom completely trusted, intimates*
Apprehension© of losing the position of power which 
was captured only after long and herd struggle comprises the 
fear for position. Actions ere taken to insure the main­
tenance of the seat of power for the oligarch* Neti end 
Soviet use of violence to eliminate threat© to their statu© 
reflect the extremes to which the reaction to the fear has 
gone.
The desire to be accepted e© an equal partner In the 
oligarch occasions much anxiety within the power holder*
The fear for acceptance is often released in policies bear** 
ing the stamp of what the power holder sense© i© expected of 
him from the rest of the oligarchy.
Many of Lincoln’© humanitarian acts were the direct 
result of hi© fear for esteem. The need to be loved and 
honored by the wide populace of a nation often ha© been the 
basis of public policies*.
For many possessor© of power, the apprehensions they 
have concerning the future ©re often as greet, if not greater,
1X3
than their concern for their present status* For a Lyndon 
Johnson, who is primarily concerned about how posterity 
will remember and judge him, the fear for legacy is the 
prime motivation of many of his actions* In his ©yes, a 
tomorrow which may not ©van include his physical self is 
more important than the power he grasps today *
When Tito mad© move© to rid Yugoslavia of Groat 
separatists, he mirrored a reaction to the fear for creation. 
Tomorrow, for such a power holder, is not to be found in 
the pages of history3 but In the organism called the nation­
state* As long as it lives a© he created or shaped it, 
the Individual lives; therefore, the power holder will 
execute moves to insure it will survive after he passes 
from the scene *
The fear for power result© in the initiation of public 
policies when the oligarch is in danger of having hi© office 
lose the prerogative© which it once held. The power holder 
who display© the tendency of acting when power, not solely 
office, 1© threatened doe© so without desiring to join the 
oligarchy ©imply to gain status a© a member of the ruling 
class* He desires, instead, to be classified a© © power 
wielder, not merely a power holder*
If a man possesses charisma and has attained hi® 
goal of capturing power largely a® a result of the gift, he 
will strive to retain hi© charisma. He know© if h® should 
lose the gift, the fear for position will become m more
1X4
prominent; anxiety. The Fear often Forces the charismatic 
individual to remain secluded, to erect larger than life 
statue© oF himself, and to broach no criticism of his 
moves# For others, however, the Fear For charisma is 
actually greater than any apprehension they have concerning 
a Future Fear For position# The impulse causes a 0© Gaulle 
to sacrifice position and not return to the public political 
arena if, in striving to return, a danger to charisma could 
result#
Being extremely egocentric end necessarily pragmatic, 
a man who is successful in hi© quest For power usually Find© 
little time or inclination to look beyond himself# Yet, 
one could argue of there having been power possessor© who 
are strongly imbued with an ideology# For them, the Fear For 
ideology is the ruling motivation of their lives# These 
men wish to gain power to Further their beliefs, not them** 
©elves# Once in possession of power, they will gear their 
actions to preserve the potency of their beliefs rather 
than their selves. The fear For ideology can be as ©11 
encompassing ©s any other Fear as evidenced in the Norwegian 
Far Barter1© willingness to sacrifice hi© position rather 
than hi© belief# Nor© often, however, the power holder will 
scrap his ideology, as Jefferson Oavis did, if his position 
is jeopardized by his adherence to ideology#
To be sure, evidence can be Found of other Fear© 
dwelling on the mind© of power holders# Even more obvious
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is the fact leader© ora afflicted with a combination of these 
anxieties* Each fear modifies the others and Fights with 
them for supremacy within the oligarch# To calm them, the 
power holder act©, often with public policies*
Those who seek to grasp the golden ring of power 
believe it will cure an ever-present, ever-©xcrut1sting 
ache that dominates their hearts and souls* They do not 
know under a coating of glitter lies a deeper, darker core 
of fear*
Once in the holder*© possession, the ring, of power, 
while retaining its glitter, unleashes th© fears it bears#
8y bringing new fears to the oligarch, power becomes, not 
a tool used by man, as much as it is a force in and by 
itself.
All men act from fear# The ..power holder stand® ©part 
from others in the force which can be exerted in the reactions 
of his fear®.
In viewing the action© of those power holders [from what 
has been said, it would seem that the term power holder Is 
actually a distortion) It would appear they could often be 
charged with employing fear tactics upon the populace* Yet, 
in reality these individuals do not use fear to the extent 
they are, in turn, gripped by it. It is merely the power 
holder*s fear which cause© him to act* Public policy, then, 
is the result of a power holder*© reaction to fear*
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